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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 19000

ELROY TILLMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is a criminal proceeding brought by the State

of Utah against Elroy Tillman charging him with Murder in the
First Degree, a capital offense, pursuant to Section 76-5-202,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On January 14, 1984, a jury found appellant guilty
as charged and on January 20, 1983, the same jury found for the
death penalty and on February 4, 1983, the trial court sentenced
appellant to death by shooting.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the
judgment of guilt rendered at trial, reversing the sentence of
death and remanding the case for a new trial, for new sentencing
procedures or for the imposition of a life sentence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
on May 26, 1982, at about Bryant Avenue and 1300 East,
Salt Lake County, Utah, Mark Allen Schoenfeld received several
blows to the head with a blunt instrument and died sometime later
as a result of asphyxiation caused by a burning mattress.
The dead victim was discovered by the State's first
witness, Craig A. Jones, who had smelled smoke about 4 a.m.,
investigated,

and some time later at 6:10 a.m. entered the

victim's apartment through the partially ajar front door.

The

witness warned the downstairs occupants and had his wife call
the Fire Department.

Through the witness, the State introduced

State's

which depict the building exterior.

1/4/83, 111-128)

(Tr.

(All references to transcript are 1983 dates

of trial with the appropriate page numbers.)
Dr.

Monique

Riser,

Assistant Medical Examiner,

conducted an autopsy on tne victim after viewing the body at
the scene

(see State's Exhibits 6-8, 10, 11) and determined that

the cause of death was

however, several blows to

the head contributed to the death and, of themselves, the blows
could have resulted
injuries solely cause death.

Ila.

i36)

as could the burning

1J4)

The witness concluded

three to six blows were struck, none of which left residue or
imprinted fabric in the wounds, although if a shirt had been
placed over the victim's head when the blows were struck, the
witness in most cases would have expected to see fabric imprint.

3
(!_cl_.

147-153)

The blows were indistinguishable with respect

to apparent force.

(.!_Q. 15 6)

down to 12 midnight to 1 a.m.

Times of death were narrowed

(Tr. 1/5, 8-10)

Kenneth Dailey, an arson investigator, testified he
investigated the subject fire on the morning of May 26, 1982,
and determined the point of origin was along the perimeter of
the mattress on which the victim was found.

The witness, through

State's Exhibit 18, was able to pinpoint the origin of the fire
at the bottom of the mattress.

(Id. 25-47)

Clarence Montgomery of

the

Woods Cross Police

Department testified that on April 13, 1982, he observed an axe
in the back of the vehicle driven by appellant.

The axe handle

had been wrapped with black tape and the axe head itself was
bigger than a Boy Scout hatchet.
Lori Groneman,
appellant for

age 22,

(Id. 96-104)
then testified she had known

five and one-half years and had lived with the

appellant in the State of California and Utah as late as August
of 1980.

She began dating the victim steadily in February, 1982,

although she had sexual relations with appellant as late as
January, 1982.

(Id. 101-119)

The witness testified she received daily calls from
appellant after she terminated the relationship in January of
1982 and on occasion saw defendant around Sperry Univac where
she was employed.

She recalled a threatening sign found on her

front

September, 1980, which she attributed to

lawn during

appellant because of unique writing characteristics.

She also

4

indicated sugar was put into the yas

of her car and that

appellant had claimed automoh1le

during the same week.

(Id. 120-135)
During March of 1982 the witness received threatening
phone calls from

a

female

caller,

received a pistol from appellant.
followed

her

and

in April of 1981 she

She also asserted appellant

three times during a two year span.

(!.9_.

136-

149)
Lori Groneman testified she went to the victim's home
after work on May 25,

1982,

and arrived there with the victim

between 5:20 and 6 p.m., had dinner consisting of barbequed shish
kebabs shortly before 10 p.m.
approximately 11 p.m.
way.

and was taken home by the victim

with a 20- or

25-minute driving time one

(Id. 150-170)
She also stated the appellant had threatened her life

in 1980 on two occasions, and in 1982 the appellant had pushed
her

against a

car

during

an argument.

170-178)

The

witness

said she recognized the voice of Carla Sagars after

meeting

her

in person at the County Attorney's office.

178-188)
During proceedings on January 6,
testified to numerous
and detailed at somE lengtr

1983, Ms. Groneman

calls between her and the appellant,
her op1n1on of appellant's threats,

misconduct of dubious impact which, although allegedly reported
to police,

never resulted in any arrest or police action.

1/6, 114-133)

(Tr.

5
She further
in April,
1982.

testified about a gun appellant gave her

1981, and the fact she bought a gun herself in March,

The witness countless times volunteered information about

her fears of appellant.

(See for

illustration only Tr. 1/6,

121, 123, 125, 129, 130, 140, 146-147, 148.)
The thrust of the witness' testimony was that she and
the appellant had a

tumultuous relationship for some years

resulting in the witness' fear of appellant.
With respect to the alleged "burglary" of the victim's
residence involving some stereo speakers, the witness testified
that appellant's speakers at all times remained at the home of
the witness with the knowledge of appellant.
Carla Sagars,

the State's

testified on January 6th

(Id. 167)

immunized

key witness,

(Tr. 1/6, 191, et seq.)

that as an

employee of the Federal Government she met appellant in August
of

1980 and

thereafter

appellant.

198)

became romantically involved with

Approximately two to three months before

the homicide, Ms. Sagars began placing calls to Lori Groneman's
residence to convey threats or questions allegedly at appellant's
request.

200-206)

Appellant was not present with the

witness when calls were made.

The witness also testified that

on two occasions she had purchased a .22 caliber revolver, shot
one of them in appellant's presence and discussed silencers with
the appellant.

208-222)

She alleged the appellant said

he was going to make a silencer.

223-227)

She further

testified she and appellant drove past the victim's house a

number of times between Marc,,,
(May, 1982);
sticker;

and the day of the homicide

that she obtained Lhe victim's name from a new car

and that she and appellant discussed explosives being

placed on

228-236)

the victim's car.

She indicated a

couple of attempts were made to discharge a bomb of some sort.

237-243)

Poisoning

discussed by the witness and

243-248), and the witness snooped around the

appellant
victim's

was

residence

at

appellant's

252-256)

request.

These activities culminated in Carla Sagars going to the victim's

(!.9_. 260-263)

house to kill him.

The witness recounted that
(Id. 265)

appellant threatened to "do it" himself.

On direct examination Carla Sagars testified at length
concerning the details of the homicide commencing with her work
day

276)

detectives
witness,

and

ending

some days

with

her

(!9..

later.

being

3 3 3)

questioned

According

by

to the

no mention was made by appellant or the witness at any

time prior to or during

the homicide that the purpose of entry

into the victim's residence was

to obtain property.

(Id. 369-

372)
Ms.

Sagars

victim's house and

stated

K1LL

planned

n1m on the spot.

or fires were not discussed.
spent by Ms.

appellant

(_!Q.

420)

to enter

(Id. 417-419)

the

Arson

Some five hours were

Sagars and the appellant in loitering about or

inside victim's residence during which time Ms. Sagars attempted
to use the telephone or walk around.
warn anyone or

call police

for

fear

She did not attempt to
of

losing

her

JOb or

7

perceived revenge from appellant.

(Id.

421,

430, 432)

A gas

can was carried by appellant to the victim's apartment front
door

and

returned

homicide.
449)

to the government automobile after the

The gas can was not observed thereafter.

(Id. 444-

Ms. Sagars stated she crawled into the victim's bedroom,

retreated,

turned on the kitchen light, re-entered the area and

observed the victim breathing but wounded as a result of one
blow.
(_!.2_.

(_!.2_.
462)

perhaps a

450-462)
Ms.

Two blows were heard by Ms. Sagars.

Sagars and appellant left taking a towel,

shirt,

the axe and a

gas can with them.

Little

conversation occurred during the trip home or while discarding
the incriminating evidence.

(Id. 467-473)

Ms. Sagars admitted

to still having some of appellant's gloves in her possession.
(Id. 476)
Several days after the homicide, Ms. Sagars told police
officers she had been with appellant the night of the homicide
and that she and appellant had driven to Pineview Reservoir and
in the direction of Logan.

(ls!.

479-480)

to contact appellant after the homicide.
"confessed"

(Id. 482-483)

She

to Detective Chapman that appellant had committed

the homicide after Miranda-type warnings.
Ms.

She never tried

(Id. 484-485)

Sagars counseled appellant against hitting the

victim again and opined that the fire should kill him; that the
bathroom light should be turned off;
good cover-up for a homicide;
might work;

that the fire might be a

that a "smoking in bed" theory

and that no property should be taken during the

8
488-493)

crime.
fire,

She Jµn1ed

involvement

in setting the

although she placed the point of origin away from her

position and toward appellant's position (but cf.
of Kenneth Dailey, supra).
On
appellant

493)

redirect and re-cross, Ms.

had

blood

the testimony

splatters on

his

Sagars indicated the
jacket although this

evidence wasn't previously disclosed in recorded statements.
(Id. 502-512)
George Groneman testified that during April,
and

thereafter,

he logged and recorded

1982,

incoming phone calls

because of the harassing nature of the calls.

(Tr. 1/10, 3-17)

Mr. Groneman had told appellant phone calls were being recorded.
A threatening sign reportedly was found by family
members in early 1982

(cf.

Lori Groneman's testimony referring

to September, 1980), although the witness was not sure of the
precise time frame.

45)

Kent Haden testified that he was appellant's supervisor
during employment wherein appellant installed glass into frames,
handled
punctual,

warehousing, etc.

(Tr.

1/10,

50-62)

Appellant was

a good worker and involved in semi-skilled operations

requiring some ability to measure and work with metal.
Appellant used or

had access to brown cotton gloves similar to

State's Exhibits 13 and 15.

(Ibid.)

Brian Taylor, Bountiful Police Officer, testified he
took reports of threatening phone calls from Lori Groneman on
March 27,

1981, and a few days later investigated Ms. Groneman's

9

complaint of sugar in the gas tank of her automobile.

(Tr. 1/10,

80-83)
Marty Vuyk, Salt Lake City Police Department, testified
that he investigated the homicide in question commencing about
6:30 a.m., May 26,

1982.

He testified the body had not been

moved prior to photographing

(Tr. 1/10, 92); that he accompanied

Ms. Sagars and other detectives to an area where burned material
was

recovered

92-96)

that

he directed

unsuccessful

attempts to recover an axe at the north Redwood Road location
indicated by Ms. Sagars

(Id. 97-99); that gloves were recovered

at a point further north on Redwood Road

(Id. 100); and laid

foundation for the State's Exhibits consisting of a burned shirt
and towel and a diagram of the area.

(Id. 100-102)

He further

testified no usable prints were found at the homicide scene.
106-107)

The burned shirt was not identifiable as a man's

or woman's shirt.

(Id. 109)

Steve Chapman,

Salt Lake City Police Department,

testified he met Carla Sagars at the airport on May 28, 1982,
took statements and procured physical evidence as a result of
those statements.

(Tr.

1/10, 126-132).

He obtained a modified

.22 caliber revolver from Ms. Sagars and a .22 caliber revolver
from Ms. Groneman.
first

132-133)

Ms. Sagars gave different

stories,

the

story being consistent with a statement

obtained

from appellant on May 26, 1982.

133-142)

In

that statement, appellant essentially told Detective Chapman
the following salient facts:

he understood his Miranda rights

10
and would talk;

he didn't know the victim;

he had never been

in the area of the homicide; he knew Carla Sagars and had spent
and night

in question with Ms. Sagars by going to Pineview

Reservoir by automobile;

he arrived home between 11:45 and 12

[p.m.]; that it was Ms. Sagars'

idea to go to Pineview; he didn't

drink alcohol; he never saw Ms. Sagars leave that night; he awoke
at 7 a.m.
as

and woke his roommate; he had spoken to Lori Groneman

late as May

25,

1982;

he

had

no desire to continue any

relationship with Lori Groneman; on the morning of May 26, 1982,
he had gone to Ms. Sagars' apartment, his apartment, the airport
and back to his apartment; he had a picture of Ms. Groneman but
not of Ms. Sagars;

he was a close acquaintance of Ms. Sagars

and would probably see her when she returned;
with Scribner;

he had a telephone number for Lori Groneman and

her father's business phone;

and that his roommate did not see

him return home on the evening of May 25, 1982.
Detective
objection,

Chapman was allowed

that the Sagars'

Sagars

had led

him to

physical evidence.

(Id. 137-158)

to

testify,

over

version was consistent with his

observation of the crime scene.
Ms.

he was friends

(Id. 159)

He recounted how

the location of various items of
160-167)

On cross-examination he

testified that the gun obtained from Ms. Sagars appeared operable
but had been modified with a standard plumbing pipe on the
barrel.

175-179)

Lab tests of Ms. Sagars' clothes were

performed, but since the clothes had been washed or possibly
were not worn by Ms. Sagars on the night of the homicide, the

11
tests proved inconclusive.
had mentioned going
25,

He notes that appellant

175)

to Ms. Sagars' apartment the evening of May

181), but later retracted that statement.

1982

1/11,

(Id.

Detective Chapman did not directly ask appellant

4-5)

if Ms. Sagars could have slipped out during the night.

(Tr.

Appellant specifically denied killing anyone when

1/10, 88)

prodded

(Tr.

by

mentioned

the witness

to the effect that

the victim had

the appellant's name to Detective Chapman shortly

before dying.

185-188)

The witness was unable to locate

physical evidence of appellant's presence at the scene such as
hair or fingerprints.

(Id. 189-190)

No witnesses, other than

Ms. Sagars, were found to place appellant at the scene or the
automobile nearby.

{Id. 189)

Detective Chapman further testified that Carla Sagars
recanted her initial story when confronted with proof that police
knew the source of phone calls and that appellant had "used
several people."
granted

(Id. 194-196)

She told her story and was

immunity without arrest or

incarceration.

192-202)

Detective Chapman confirmed that Ms. Sagars had stated
the

fire

was

started at

the foot of the victim's bed, more

towards the east side vis-a-vis the west side.
He

also

confirmed

that

Ms.

Sagars

had

not,

(Id. 196-197)
during

the

investigation, mentioned the fact appellant had crawled out of
the car window,

had not mentioned that appellant had a watch,

had not mentioned that appellant had a gasoline can, had not

12
mentioned that appellant had turned on the kitchen light, and
had not mentioned that it was Sagars'
fire.

(.!_-9_.

205-207)

idea to light the bed on

Neither had she mentioned anything about

blood on appellant's jacket.

(Ibid.)

On redirect Detective Chapman stated he had not asked
specific questions concerning the omissions noted, supra (Id.
209-212),

and on

re-cross

statements concerning Ms.

he

further

Sagars'

defined

appellant's

potential absence from

appellant during the time of the homicide.

(See Tr. 1/11, 7-11)

Portions of the tape recording of appellant's statement
were inaudible or undecipherable.
Oscar Henderson,
examined

the modified

a firearms expert,

.22 caliber

commercially-made silencer for
such modifications.

(.!_.9.. 10-13)
testified he had

revolver and produced a

illustration of the effect of

(Id. 19-35)

Martha Kerr,

serologist,

testified that in examining

the pair of brown gloves in evidence, she detected human blood.

(.!_£.

37)

She examined the clothing submitted by Ms.

some time after the homicide and detected no blood.
no negroid hairs or any hairs on such items.
victim's pull-over sweater

(Exhibit 38)

similar to the victim's blood.
the gloves for

(_!.-9_.

3 9)

(Id.

Sagars

She found
3 9)

The

had human blood on it
She did not examine

negroid hairs and was not requested to do so.

(Id. 49-50)
Robert Brinkman testified as an explosives expert that
he received certain residue from Detective Chapman,

examined

13
the same and concluded the residue contained ammonium nitrates.
Ammonium

nitrate and fuel oil or gasoline in mixture can be

explosive.

(Tr. 1/11, 67-84)
The State rested and appellant called Dan George who

testified that

in connection with his employment at a Bountiful

auto dealership,
car had sugar

he had received reports that Lori Groneman's

in the gas tank.

He examined the affected parts

and concluded sugar had been placed into the gasoline tank of
the car.

He found no evidence of ground glass.
Donald Kartchner,

(Tr. 1/12, 4-9)

an employee of an engineering firm,

testified he had examined a fuel filter submitted for examination
and determined sugar was present.

He found no ground glass,

although extensive analysis was not conducted.
Mark Welch,

called

by appellant,

(Id. 11-18)
testified he had

become appellant's roommate during March of 1982, in part because
of similarity in the fastidious housekeeping habits of the two
men.

18-22)

except

for

a

There were no hand tools in the apartment

cresent

screwdrivers.
24)
and

wrench,

23)

a

pair of

pliers and some

There was no axe or hatchet.

Mr. Welch saw appellant in the morning on May 25,
again at

arrived

4:30 p.m.

between

5:30

1982,

that day.

He testified Carla Sagars

and

p.m.

6:30

that day wearing a

long-sleeved white shirt, not the terrycloth blue-trimmed shirt
labeled Defense Exhibit 42.
After
returned,

Mr.

Ms.

Sagars

Welch

(Id. 27-29)
and

invited

appellant went to K-Mart and
the

two

to eat dinner

at the

14
apartment.

A friend dropped by and at approximately 7:00-7:30

p.m., appellant and Ms. Sagars left.

Appellant stated he and

Ms. Sagars were going to drive to Ogden.

(I.£. 29-31)

Mr. Welch testified he saw appellant return between
10:30 and 11:00 p.m., although he did not see Carla Sagars at
that time.

He further

testified he heard appellant in the

bathroom about half an hour afterwards but did not observe or
hear Ms.

Sagars

According

in the apartment

to Mr.

appellant on a

Welch,

fairly

that night.

32-34)

Ms. Sagars would spend nights with

regular basis.

performed laundry chores

(!2·

for

appellant's room and closet.

(!2·

appellant
(Id.

37)

and

36)

Ms. Sagars

had access to

He also indicated Ms.

Groneman frequently called for appellant, in fact, almost daily.

(1.2.

38)

Appellant had informed the witness of an intention

to return to California in the fall of 1982 and that appellant's
relationship with Ms. Sagars was ending.
24,

1982, Mr.

(Id. 39-41)

On May

Welch had occasion to view the trunk of the

Oldsmobile Cutlass and saw no gasoline can or hatchet.

(!2·

41-42)
Mr. Welch had given a sworn statement on May 26, 1982,
wherein he had indicated appellant returned at 11 p.m. on May
25, 1982, but Mr. Welch did not then state, nor at trial, that
he saw Ms. Sagars in the apartment during the early morning hours
of May 26,
Ms.

1982.

(1.2.

Sagars had spent

57-59)
the

Appellant told Mr. Welch that

night in the apartment.

(_!.Q·

62)

Mr. Welch denied that appellant harassed Lori Groneman on the

15
telephone or vice-versa.

(Id. 73)

He indicated that appellant

had sole access to a storage shed which could have contained
hatchets,

gas cans, ammonia nitrate, etc.

(.!..9_. 74-75)

Mr.

Welch also stated that George Groneman had called appellant
several times shortly before the homicide.
witness

brought and

(.!..9_. 90-91)

The

identified the shirt which he believed

appellant wore on the night of May 25, 1982.

(Id. 97-101)

During "in camera" proceedings, Sergeant Kenneth Thirsk
was admonished by the Court and counsel to abstain from referring
to any polygraph examination of Carla Sagars.

104-107)

(Tr. 1/12,

The parties stipulated a prefer and objections to

polygraph testimony would be forthcoming.
Sergeant Thirsk testified to the jury he had discussed
Ms. Sagars'

testimony with Ms. Sagars a few days before trial

commenced.

In response to the accusation by Sergeant Thirsk

that he did not believe Ms. Sagars'

story,

(actually based on

polygraph results of which the jury was not aware), the following
colloquy occurred:

Q Would you, Officer, be so kind as to tell
the jury and the Court the content of that
conversation as best you can recall, relating
to your questions and her answers in response
thereto?
A
The conversation regarded Carla's
particular activities herself during the
incident at Mark Schoenfeld's home.
During
that conversation at one point I told her
that I did not believe her answers to my
questions and told her that I believed she
had in fact struck Mark and I made that
accusation.

16

Q

Did she respond t0 thAt Accusation?

A

Yes, she did.

Q

And what was her response?

A Her response was, "If you want me to say
I hit him, I will."
I then said, "I don't want you to say that
Tell me what
unless i t ' s the truth.
happened."
She said, "I will testify that I hit him
if that's what you want."
I then asked her, "How many times did you
hit him," and she responded, "Twice."
I then asked, "Which side did you hit him?"
She said, "The left side."
I

then asked,

you on?"

"Which side of the bed were

And she said, "I don't recall."
I then asked,
weapon?"

"Did Tillman hand you the

Her response was, "He must have."
I then asked,
Mark?"

"Did Tillman tell you to hit

Her response was, "He must have."
I then told her I didn't want to know what
must have happened, I wanted to know what
did happen. Her response was, "I don't know
why I am telling you this, it isn't true
anyway. I .J1,)n't h1t him."
(_!.Q. 110-111)
Sergeant Thirsk also recounted that Carla Sagars had
admitted that she was in the victim's room the moment blows were
struck contrary to a previous denial of having been in the room
at

that

time.

(.!_-9_.

112-113)

The

witness

noted other

17
inconsistencies

in Ms.

(undisclosed polygraph)

Sagars'

responses during

the

two

interrogations such as mentioning the

kitchen light switch in the second interrogation but not in the
first

(l2·

light

in

114-115),

the second

interrogation.
inconsistencies
switch.

and mentioning turning off a bathroom
interrogation, but not in the previous

(l2·

116)

involving

Sergeant

the gas can,

Thirsk

noted

revolver and light

(Id. 118)
Appellant

rested,

having reserved "in camera" the

proffer of the polygraph evidence.
The
witness.
hair

State

recalled Lori Groneman as

a

rebuttal

She testified appellant customarily shaved his body

including hair on his hands although he appeared not to

have done so before or during the trial.

(Tr. 1/12, 135-136)

On cross-examination Ms. Groneman admitted that appellant had
returned her calls, according to taped telephone conversations,
and that she had no way of knowing the existence or lack of body
hair during May of 1982.

(Id. 137-138)

The parties rested, having reserved appellant's proffer
of polygraph evidence for the next day.
until January 14, 1982, at 9 a.m.

The jury was dismissed

(Tr. 1/12, 138-140)

On January 13, 1982, appellant proffered the testimony
ul

Dr.

Kircher

and Sergeant Thirsk

relative

examinations in general and Ms. Sagars'

to polygraph

deceptive performance

in a polygraph conducted January 3, 1982, two days before trial.
\See generally Tr. 1/13, et seq.)

On January 3, 1982, Sergeant

18

Thirsk conducted a polygraph examination of Carla Sagars.

He

concluded she was deceptive in denying relevant questions 5 and
7 set forth below:
Question 5:
At the exact instance any of
the blows were struck, were you holding the
weapon?
Question 6:
Was the weapon ever in your
possession when Mark was struck with it?
(Id. 89)
Sergeant Thirsk

received

verification of

his

conclusions from three other polygraph examiners, all of whom
were law enforcement employees.

(Id. 86, 90-91)

Closing arguments and jury instructions were conducted
January 14, 1983.
On January 14, 1983, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty upon one count of criminal homicide, murder in the first
degree,

a capital offense.

On January 20, 1983, the case

reconvened for the "penalty phase."

Prior to commencement of

the proceedings, appellant had filed a motion to admit evidence
of Ms. Sagars' polygraph.

(Record at 281)

Charles Illsley, a sergeant at West Valley City Police
Department, testified as a fingerprint expert over appellant's
objection and stated that in his opinion the fingerprints of
appellant were the same as the fingerprints contained in the
exemplified and certified copies of fingerprints sent to the
witness by various correctional and judicial agencies.

The

witness also prepared a large exhibit listing appellant's
purported convictions in other jurisdictions.

(Tr. 1/20, 5-16)

19
Appellant renewed his objection to evidence of past convictions.
(Id. 67-68)
William T. Bailey testified that as a federal probation
officer

he

first met appellant

in 1980 when appellant was

released from a federal halfway house to probation.

18)
a

(Tr. 1/20,

Over objection, Mr. Bailey testified that parolees sign

parole

agreement which prohibits

the usual and sundry

activities generally proscribed of parolees,
possession of firearms or explosives.
The State

rested.

including the

(Id. 20)

Appellant called Roscoe Fowler,

appellant's brother, who testified that appellant fulfilled the
father

role in his life, as well as the role of brother.

(Id.

24-35)

Mark Welch testified that appellant gave of himself
willingly, was a positive influence in the witness'

life and

would never become indebted to the witness for one red cent.

(!.9..

3 8- 4 0)

with his

Mr. Welch recounted how appellant strove to be

(appellant's)

son and had a close family relationship.

Appellant assisted others and gave his time voluntarily to those
in need.

(Id. 40-43)
Creola Fowler,

appellant's mother,

testified that

appellant was the fifth child out of eight children.
never

had

the

benefit of

a father.

Appellant

She never observed any

violent behavior by appellant other than the usual schoolyard
scraps of a young boy.
son,

She opined that God should judge her

not society at this trial.

Although appellant's mother
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CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S
F,\JLLRE TL) TESTIFY REQUIRE REVERSAL.

Dur 1nq
c1.,

counsel

closing arguments at

for

the State argued:

the guilt phase of

"You have haJ a chance

·'·'< c1t t:l"''i' T1l.lman dur1ny these proceed1ngs.
Detecting anything?"
This comment
r.. •t
is

1mpl1ed or

srlc)Wn remorse of any
own behalf,

and

(Tr.

the

l '14,

Detecting

28)

inferred that appel•ant had

Kind because he nad not test1f1ed in

therefore,

ne was obv1ous:y guilty.

Such

comment might nave escaped unnoticed by the iury;
w0v0r,

the comment was preceded by comments ostensibly directed

·,• ,·cir ici Sagars but clearly designed to
1;

r ,

•• •
J i t_ •

.1

n

t

.,. ci s

g u 1 l t '/

impress the iury that

because he ex er c is e d a cons t i tut ion a 1

That comment was:
Even tnougn you may say to yourselves,
Ccirla Sagars isn't any better than Elroy
Tillman, she did have a heart and she did
tell tl1e truth, and she 01dn't demand
1mmun1t:i:, snP didn't
,Tr . .
·L: _, m p

:i

14,

r 1nq ,

1n

w1tr.

o ne

s e n t e nc e ,

l :"'.

c o nd uc t

of

t he

the conduct of appellant at trial in the

const1tut1onal
·'

t he

rights clearly

.as t:.roy Tillman nas done

J':.tJ

t'--J

inferred

the

(to indicate

Jetense counsel• s

sumrnat1on
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to the jury in the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecuting
attorney

again referred

to appellant's

lack of

remorse.

Appellant submits that these comments were designed to penalize
appellant's failure to testify in his own defense;
had

that express effect;

and

that

they

that they

therefore deprived

appellant of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Article I,

Section 12 of

the Constitution of Utah.

They

impermissibly tainted the process which resulted in the jury
returning

a verdict of death despite

circumstances of this case.
aside

the

the unextraordinary

As a result, this Court should set

finding of guilt and/or the verdict of death, and

remand for further proceedings.
The central offending comment of counsel during penalty
is at lines 1 through 15 of page 114

(Tr.

1/20).

And, though

the statement suffers the failure of precise syntax common to
oral expression, the sense of the statement is this:
.there is not a system [for the
control and governance of human affairs]
on the face of the earth--including the
mosaic law or the law of Christianity--that
will work unless the individual sole (sic)
wishes it to work.
[Mr. Tillman's conduct,
as demonstrated by his felony record
indicates that he does not respect any such
system].
[He has rebelled] against the most
sacred of obligations, to protect human
life.
. [and] all the other things that
Elroy Tillman has broken along the way.
[N]o system in the world will work without
the person himself--humility-wise and with
remorse--saying, "I want it to work." And
you haven't heard Elroy Tillman say that.

23
Reduced to syllogistic form, counsel's argument was this:
By his prior conduct Tillman has
demonstrated that he has no respect for the
law and is therefore likely to continue to
pose a serious threat to society.
Were he
at least to speak to you and declare his
willingness to abide the law, then there
might be some hope of rehabilitating him.
But he hasn't stood before you and expressed
humility or remorse, or sworn that he will
honor the sacred obligation to protect human
life and conform his actions to the rules.
Therefore, you should require his death.
Though disagreeing with the rationale of the argument, appellant
acknowledges its compelling force and persuasiveness.
counsel was an articulate and forceful advocate.

State's

It is precisely

because the argument is so persuasive that it has repeatedly
been held to impermissibly penalize the right to remain silent
and thus deny due process.
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
106, 85 S.Ct. 1229
Amendment,

609, 14 L.Ed.2d

(1965), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth

in its direct application to the federal government

and its bearing on the states under

the Fourteenth Amendment,

expressly forbids comment by the prosecution on the accused's
silence.

In specifying the reasons for

the Court's holding,

Justice Douglas said:
.comment on the refusal to testify
is a remnant of the "inquisitorial system
of criminal justice," [citation omitted]
which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.
It is
a penalty imposed by courts for exercising
a constitutional privilege.
It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion
costly.

* * *

Defendant contends that the reason a
defendant refuses to testify is that his
prior convictions will be introduced in
evidence to impeach him [statutory citations
omitted] and not that he is unable to deny
the accusations.
It is true that the
defendant might fear that his prior
convictions will prejudice the jury, and
that therefore another possible inference
can be drawn from his refusal to take the
stand.
[Internal references omitted.]
This holding has never been reversed or substantially modified.
In commenting

on

factual contexts,

the

application of the

rule to particular

the Fifth Circuit held in United States v.

Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246

(1977), that:

To reverse for improper comment by the
prosecutor, we must find one of two things:
that "the prosecutor's manifest intention
was to comment upon the accused's failure
to testify" or that the remark was "of such
a character that the jury would naturally
and necessarily take it to be a comment on
the failure of the accused to testify."
Id. at 1249

705,

B7 S.Ct.

B24

(1967),

the Supreme Court held that

(1)

violation of the Griffin rule is constitutional error and that
once the error has been proven the burden is on the state to
show

that

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

In
1133

390 U.S.
(196B),

523,

20 L.Ed.2d Bl,

rehearing denied 391 U.S.

929,

BBS.Ct.

the Supreme Court

reiterated its allegiance to strict application of the Griffin
rule.

There, improper comments had been made and the conviction

was challenged by Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus which was granted

25
hy

the U.S. District Court.

The Ninth Circuit reversed.

The

supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Writ, saying:
We agree with Judge Ely that comment
on a defendant's failure to testify cannot
be labeled harmless error in a case where
such comment is extensive, where an inference
of guilt from silence is stressed to the
jury as a basis of conviction, and where
there is evidence that could have supported
acquittal.
We find this is such a case.
Id. 390 U.S. at 523-524
Though counsel's unlawful comment during penalty is
found in a single unrepeated sentence, that sentence formed the
basis of an extensive, well-reasoned and logically persuasive
argument in favor of death and drew further sustenance from prior
references during the guilt phase.

He made it plain to the jury

that death was the appropriate penalty because defendant had
not verbally manifest his intent to comply with society's rules
of conduct in the future should he be permitted to live.
Finally, under

the Court's instructions, the jury was not

permitted to return a verdict of death unless it found, beyond
a

reasonable doubt,

alternative.

that death was the only appropriate

We certainly cannot be certain beyond a reasonable

doubt that the State's improper argument did not influence the
Jury to return its verdict mandating the ultimate penalty.

The

edicts of the highest court in the land require relief in this
case.
Counsel's argument was closely similar in content and
identical in thrust to the penalty phase argument found "most
e g r e g i o us "

in

te

1 o a_'.:!, 2 9 8 S . E . 2 d 9 2 ( S • C. , 19 8 2) at

2b

95, set forth below:
The solicitor urged the Jury to consider
appellant's plea of not guilty as evidence
that appellant lacked remorse.
"Has anyone
said to you he's sorry, sorry for what he
did?
.What have you been told up until
you found him guilty.
He has pled not
guilty.
As he sits in this courtroom, he
is not guilty.
.Is that someone who wants
to be rehabilitated?"
This argument was clearly improper,
as no right is more fundamental than the
right of an accused to plead not guilty and
put the State to its proof.
A defendant's
exercise of his right to plead not guilty
is never a permissible basis upon which to
impose the death penalty; this is
particularly true in a capital case in this
state, where a defendant must plead not
guilty to have his sentence determined by
a jury.
S.C. Code Ann., Section 16-3-20(B).
Ibid.
So. 2d
Cr.L.Rptr.

(Fla., 1983), 34

similarly holding an inferred comment on

2166,

defendant's silence is error.
This court has spoken in State_.':'...:.._Eaton, 569 P.2d
1114

(1977), saying:

The error of principal concern here
is defendant's claim of improper remarks
of the prosecutor during his argument to
the jury.
The prosecutor stressed the fact
that only the prosecution's key witness (the
alleged buyer, Ken Goode) and the defendant
"really know what took place in that house;"
and then asked".
.What does the defendant
tell us?"
He also stated that:
"I listened
to the entire defense in this case and never
heard one shred of evidence from the
defendant to prove any motive any reason
that showed that Ken Goode was out to get
blacks in this community."
.We approve and reaffirm that duty
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and privilege of analyzing the whole evidence
as a general proposition.
However, there
is a point beyond which it must not go in
regard to the defendant's constitutional
right just referred to; and this includes
that it should not be impaired or destroyed
by making comments on the failure of the
defendant to take the witness stand.
It is to be noted that in the Kazda
case, referred to above, the distinction
we have just discussed was pointed out; and
that although the prosecution did analyze
the evidence, it made no such reference to
the fact that the defendant did not testify
as was done here.
Upon a fair analysis of
the prosecutor's remarks here, the conclusion
cannot be escaped that it was but a thinly
disguised attempt to do indirectly what the
prosecutor know could not properly be done
directly; that is, to comment on the fact
that the defendant had chosen not to take
the witness stand; and to persuade the jury
to draw inferences as to his guilt because
of his exercise of that constitutional
privilege.
Consistent with the nature of the
criminal proceedings and the protections
accorded those accused of crime under our
law, including the presumption of innocence
and the burden of the state to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
we believe that, on appeal, when there is
a reasonable doubt as to whether the error
below was prejudicial, that doubt should
be resolved in favor of the defendant. This
is especially true where the error involved
is one which transgresses against the
exercise of a constitutional right.
Consequently, the rule which we have numerous
times stated is that if the error is such
as to justify a belief that i t had a
substantial adverse effect upon the
defendant's right to a fair trial, in that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in
its absence there may have been a different
result, the the error should not be regarded
as harmless; and conversely, if the error
is such that it is clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was harmless in that the result
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would have been the same, tt1en the error
should not be deemed prejudicial and warrant
granting a new trial.
When the defendant's attacks on his
conviction are considered in the light of
the foregoing principals, and in connection
with the total picture as presented in this
case, including the nature of the pivotal
evidence of the state, which we advert to
below, we cannot conclude with the required
assurance that the matters complained of
were not prejudicial.
(Footnotes omitted.)
More recently, this Court has made its view of such
improper argument equally clear.
P. 2d 146

(1981), the Court reversed defendant's conviction of

two counts of aggravated robbery where in trial, defendant had
argued that he was present at the scenes of the crimes but that
he was an unwilling participant in the robberies.

To rebut this

defense, the prosecutor had adduced evidence and argued to the
jury in rebuttal that after defendant had been arrested and
Mirandized, he had failed to mention that fact in protest of
his arrest.

The Court held:

The case that appears to be the
controlling case is
426
U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240,
(1976).
Even if it could be validly argued
that defendant's objection and the court's
attempt to cure the matter by striking the
admonition were effective, this cannot be
said about prosecutor's comments during his
final argument.
The continued attempts by
the prosecutor to put the defendant's silence
before the jury after his having been advised
of his right to remain silent amounts to
prosecutorial misconduct.
The references to defendant's silence
are fundamental error, which could have
affected the result and are therefore
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prejudicial. The reasons for extending this
protection are adequately discussed in
supra, and need not be repeated
here.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
See also

652 P.2d 1290

(Utah, 1982).

Those

rules having been made clear by the Court, we must turn to State
v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261

(1980), wherein the Court specifically

speaks to the level of care which must be exercised in the trial
of capital cases to avoid any just criticism that the death
penalty has been imposed arbitrarily or unfairly.
Justice Wilkins:
Scrupulous care must be exercised by
the State in capital cases in both the
guilt-determining and penalty phases in
presentation of evidence and argument because
of the acknowledged uniqueness of the death
penalty.
Citing Mr. Justice Stevens in
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58

(1976)-:-------------

That "scrupulous care" must extend to all facets of the trial
process in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.

A

capital case requires even closer scrutiny than other trials
and:
. [t]he prosecutor's actions at
sentencing.
.must be viewed differently.
At the sentencing phase of trial, the jury
must not be influenced by any arbitrary
factors.
A prosecutor may not incite the
passions of a jury when a person's life hangs
in the balance.
Brooks v. Francis, 716
F. 2d 7 8 0 (11th cir. I -pfa""T)-at-288-:----At trial, defendant did not testify either during the
guilt phase or in the penalty phase.
tactical choice.

This was a permissible

(United States v. Gibson, 536 F.2d 1110 (5th

Circuit, 1976))
To nullify defendant's tactical decisions by means
of fundamental error of constitutional magnitude specifically
designed to influence the jury to return a verdict of death and
to seek the death penalty on the basis the defendant has not
stepped

forward and

testified to express his remorse or

willingness to abide by the laws of society, is such fumdamental
error that the penalty proceedings must be set aside.

The

overwhelming weight of authority requires reversal of the penalty
and further proceedings or the imposition of a life sentence.
To allow comments on appellant's silence, however
subtle,

to infect the guilt determination proceedings in a

capital case likewise

is such fundamental error that those

proceedings must also be reversed and the case remanded for
further proceeding.
II
COMMENTS DURING SUMMATION WERE IMPROPER
AND, IN SUM, REQUIRE REVERSAL.

A number of assertions were made throughout arguments
during the guilt and penalty phases of trial which cumulatively
warrant reversal, especially when viewed in light of the comments
discussed at Part I of this brief relative to appellant's failure
to testify.

Although the clairevoyance of hindsight may tend

to elevate the impact of isolated comments, appellant submits
that

the

cumulative effect of the below-quoted comments

impermissibly injected a fervor and passion into the process
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sufficient
death.

to

sway

the

Such comments

jury into returning the sentence of
include,

in addition to the comments

treated elsewhere, the following:
And I consider it significant that the
police from Bountiful who testified on the
stand were getting between ten and fifteen
reports of incidences daily from the
Gronemans during 1982.
Tr. 1/14 at
97.
Not only

is the factual content patently erroneous

(cf. Tr. 1/10, 79-83),

the comment also interjects the personal

opinion of the prosecutor.

In State v. Johnson,

663 P.2d 48

(Utah, 1983), this Court stated, though dictum, that statements
evincing the prosecutor's personal opinion and references to
improper factors would have required reversal had the Court not
already found

independent grounds to reverse the conviction.

Personal opinions of the prosecutor generally have been held
to constitute reversible error.
639 P.2d 889

See, e.g., Bowder v. State,

(Wyo., 1982), and cases cited therein.

At Tr. 1/14, 106:
I kind of would like to wonder what
would happen, for instance, if the Mormon
Tabernacle Choir observed the whole killing,
how would Mr. Barber attempt to discredit
them? Think about that one.
Besides

interjecting personal opinions and beliefs
supra),

this comment further appeals to

the religious feelings of the jury.
obtained by

Convictions should not be

inciting passions or prejudices of the jury.
513 P. 2d 422

(State

(Utah, 1973), and State v. Creviston,

646 P.2d 750

(Utah, 1982))

During penalty phase, Tr. 1/20 at 83:
If you are cowards and you must say
to yourselves, "The law has no meaning and
we can randomly go about intentionally,
knowingly killing people," and that is the
signal you will portray unless you find the
appropriate sentence in this case.
This comment was
passion,

a pure and simple appeal to jury

closely analogous to young lads at play using the

derisive "chicken!" call to initiate a particularly daring or
dangerous youthful stunt.
Also during penalty phase, Tr. 1/20 at 84:
.but if I have conveyed to you any
meaning other than the most serious and
solemn of duties to present to you in this
case, I apologize for that because it's a
serious and solemn duty and I wouldn't be
the penal!Y o1-aeatl1under
circumstances or con9,it.io.ns than
duties."

(Emphasis added.)

A prosecutor's request for the death penalty predicated
upon his assertion that he would not seek the same penalty again
if the jury did not return with a recommendation (under the South
Carolina system)
284 S.E.2d 221

of death warranted reversal in State v. Plath,

(S.C., 1981).

The comment quoted above again

injected the personal feelings of the prosecuting attorney and
was designed to have the jury consider matters improperly before
them.

(State v. Johnson, supra)
The A.B.A.

Standards for Criminal Justice apply to

prosecution and defendant alike (Sections 5.8 and 7.8, 1st Ed.,
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respectively)

and appellant's counsel does not assert defense

counsel likewise did not make some improper comment or argument
during

this trial.

as professionals,

Feelings run high during such cases,

but

those personal feelings have no place in

counsel's demeanor or speech;

nor should personal feelings and

passions influence the trial and penalty of any criminal case.
A capital case deserves more.

Both the guilt phase and penalty

phase were tainted and therefore should both be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
III

EXCLUSION OF POLYGRAPH OPINION EVIDENCE
WAS A DENIAL OF "DUE PROCESS".
Appellant

filed

a

motion in limine requesting the

evidentiary admission of expert testimony concerning the
foundation of polygraphs and the results of a polygraph performed
upon the State's critical witness, Carla Sagars, by Sergeant
Kenneth Thirsk of the Salt Lake City Police Department.

(Record

at 89)
Appellant also filed a separate motion to permit the
introduction of
phase.
Lrial

such polygraph evidence during the penalty

(Record at 281)

Both requests were denied although the

court permitted defense counsel to call and examine

Sergeant Thirsk concerning statements made by Carla Sagars during
the particular polygraph examination which occurred only two

days before

trial.

(Tr.

1/12,

1013-135)

The Court requircJ

counsel to abstain from any mention of polygraph or the fact
Ms. Sagars was shown deceptive.

(.!5:!.

lOJ-107)

The jury was later excused to permit appellant to make
a proffer relative to the polygraph test in question and further
to permit laying a foundation evidence.
A.

(Tr. 1/13, 1-122)

EXCLUSION OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE DURING
THE GUILT PHASE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR

The trial court was of the opinion that absent express
authorization

this

court,

polygraph

results were

(Tr. 1/3, 119)

Appellant contends the Rules of

(hereafter U.R.E.}

and case law both permit the

inadmissible.
Evidence

from

introduction of properly founded expert opinions and polygraph
results.
The Utah Rules of Evidence at time of trial provided
as follows:
When a person's character or
a trait of his character is in issue, it
may be proved by testimony in the form of
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence
of specific instances of the person's
conduct, subject, however, to the limitations
of Rules 47 and 48.
Rule 47.
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait
OTa---Person's character is relevant as
tending to prove his conduct on a specified
occasion, such trait may be proved in the
same manner as provided by Rule 46, except
that (a} evidence of specific instances of
conduct other than evidence of conviction
of a crime which tends to prove the trait
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to be bad shall be inadmissible, and (b)
in a criminal action evidence of a triat
of an accused's character as tending to prove
his guilt or innocence of the offense
charged, (i) may not be excluded by the judge
under Rule 45 if offered by the accused to
prove his innocence, and (ii) if offered
by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may
be admitted only after the accused has
introduced evidence of his good character.
Rule 48.
Evidence of a trait of a person's
character with
to care or skill is
inadmissible as tending to prove the quality
on a specified occasion.
Opinion testimony is also governed by Rule 56 set forth
below:
(1) If the witnesss is not testifying
as an expert, his testimony in the form of
opinion or inferences is limited to such
opinions or inferences as the judge finds
(a) may be rationally based on the perception
of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or to the
determination of the fact in issue.
(2) If the witness is testifying as
an expert, testimony of the witness in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited
to such opinions as the judge finds are (a)
based on facts or data perceived by or
personally known or made known to the witness
at the hearing ad (b) within the scope of
the special knowledge, skill, experience
or training possessed by the witness.
(3) Unless the judge excludes the
testimony he shall be deemed to have made
the finding requisite to its admission.
(4) Testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences otherwise admissible under
these rules is not objectionable because
it embraces the ultimate issue or issues
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to be decided by the trier of tlie fact.
and Rule 58, also reproduced below:
Questions calling for the opinion of
an expert witness need not be hypothetical
in form unless the judge in his discretion
so requires, but the witness may state his
opinion and reasons therefor without first
specifying data on which it is based as an
hypothesis or otherwise; but upon
cross-examination he may be required to
specify such data.
The general gist and intent of the foregoing
was

not

rules

substantially modified with the September 1, 1983,

adoption of new rules of evidence.
Stipulations concerning the admissibility of polygraph
evidence result in treatment as any other evidence.
State v. Jenkins,
v. Tanner,

523 P.2d 1232

675 P.2d 539

(Utah,

(Utah,
1983),

1974).

Also,

See e.g.,
in State

a bench trial in which

polygraph results were admitted over the State's objection but
not cross-appealed,
of polygraph

the Court noted that weight and credibility

results are for

the finder of fact.

551)

Admissibility of the polygraph was not in issue.
With

respect

of

case

law at

companion cases of
and State v. Collins,

time of

600 P.2d 994
612 P.2d 775

(Utah,

trial,

(Utah,

1980),

the

1979),

both raised

the admissibility issue betore this court and both were found
deficient with
foundation.

respect
In

to the evidentiary record regarding
involving

a

polygraph given

the
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de(enJant concurring the victim's consent, this court held:
This brings us to the third point.
A large number of states have ruled upon
the admissibility of lie detector tests,
and most of them have excluded those tests
from evidence, at least in the absence of
a stipulation.
This does not, of course,
foreclose this Court from reassessing the
question of reliability and admissibility
of the test.
It may well be that recent
developments in this area of endeavor, as
argued by the State, have progressed to the
point where polygraph tests should be held
admissible irrespective of a stipulation.
But in this particular case, we do not find
a sufficient foundation in either the briefs
or the testimony in the trial court for
assessing the reliability and probative value
of a polygraph examinaton given the alleged
perpetrator of the crime to determine the
issue of an alleged rape victim's consent.
600 P.2d at 998
supra,
administered
consent.
record

upon

also

involved a

with

respect

polygraph test
to

the victim's

There was a similar evidentiary deficiency in the

with

respect

to

foundation,

and

consequently,

defendant-appellant's claim of improper exclusion of polygraph
results was denied.

The Court tendered guidance to those "in

the trenches" seeking to lay a proper foundation for review of
admissibility issues.

At 612 P.2d 778, the Court suggested the

expert testify concerning the following factors:
(1) validity of underlying theory;
(2) practical application of theory to fabrication
detection;
(3) verifiability; and
(4) successful deception by subject.
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Using

the

dictum of

counsel proffered the

testimony of Sergeant Thirsk and Dr. John Kircher, M.S., Ph.D,
to establish the test results and foundation for admission.
Dr.

Kircher, employed at the University of Utah in

the Department of Psychology with a speciality in experimental
psychology

(Defendant's Exhibit 46),

testified to the basic

polygraph test theory (Tr. 1/13, 6-9); the validity of the theory
in field
accuracy
to

studies and laboratory studies indicating a 90-95%
(Id.

9-11);

to the practical application of the theory

deception detection

(_!_S!.

11-13

and 14-24);

and

the

likelihood of successful deception of the examiner by a deceptive
person.

(Id. 47-48, 55-77)
Kenneth Thirsk

testified

that

as

an experienced,

licensed polygraph examiner, he conducted a polygraph examination
of Carla Sagars on January 3,

1983,

free of any threat or

hypnosis, expecting the test to run smoothly with a positive
result

(_!_S!.

80-84)

When posed the relevant questions "At

the exact instant any of the blows were stuck, were you holding
the weapon?" and "Was the weapon ever

in your possession when

Mark was struck with it?", Carla Sagars denied the questions; but
analysis of the polygraph tracings by Sergeant Thirsk and three
other State employees clearly indicated deception.
In order

(Id. 80-91)

to illustrate the adequacy of defendant's
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offer

depth

(which naturally is substantially limited in detail and
and seeks merely

testimony sought

to state

the general nature of the

to be admitted;

see Rule 5, Utah Rules of

Evidence in effect at trial, now denoted Rule 103), this portion
of the brief will address the nature of the proffered testimony
with respect to each of the four foundational criteria suggested
by this court in Collins:
(1) Validity of underlying
theory

Control question techniques
have been validated in both
field studies and laboratory
studies which indicate a 9095% validity.
(Tr. 1/13 at
6-13)

(2) Practical application of
theory to fabrication
detection

Measurement of physiological
activity (Id. 11-13) is
compared numerically (Id.
15-17) and a correlation coefficient of .97 indicating
sound practical application.
(Id. 18-19)
Control questions are discussed beforehand to avoid
surprise and its reaction.
(Id. 63)
Such occurred
i"il""this case.
(Id. 85)

(3) Verifiability

Numerical techniques have
a correlation co-efficient
of .97 (Id. 18-19) and other
studies have discounted the
friendly polygraph hypothesis.
(Id. 61-62)
The instant polygraph charts
were blind scored by three
other examiners, all of whom
were enforcement related.
(Id. 86, 90, admitted
eXFiibits at 91)
Scoring
showed deception.
(Id.
90-91)

Studies have been directed
at false negative error which
is not applicable to this
case.
(Id. 14 and
especially 47-48)
There
is no evidence to suggest
a deceptive person can be
termed truthful.
(Id.
55-56)

(4) Successful Deception

The adequacy of the proffer must be interpreted in
light of

the very limited use sought;

i.e.,

for

impeachment

purposes and to indicate the factual circumstances of Ms. Sagars'
statement she hit the victim twice.
Naturally any proffer must pass the muster of
relevance,

(2)

competency

and

(3)

policy.

381 N.E.2d 582

See

(1)

e.g.,

(Mass., 1978), for

application to polygraph evidence.
(1)

Relevant evidence is defined as evidence tending

to make the existence of any material fact more or less likely.
(Rule 1(2), U.R.E.

(now Rule 401))

is

testimony undoubtedly is relevant to the

believed,

such

If the proffered testimony

credibility of the State's main witness.

See

v. Ridling, 350 F.Supp. 90, n. 5 (E.D. Mich., 1972).
(2)
evidence "

Competent evidence from an expert is defined as
.based on facts or data personally known or made

known to the witness at the hearing and within the scope of the
special knowledge,
the witness."

skill, experience or training possessed by

(Rule 56(2), U.R.E.

(now Rules 702, 703 and 704))

Such competency in polygraph admissibility cases was deemed
lacking as early as 1923 in ££Ye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
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10.c. App.),

and a host of decisions annotated at 53 A.L.R.3d

1005 in which the courts generally held that polygraph theory
and

techniques

acceptance

had

not

risen to the appropriate level of

within

the

scientific community.

essentially ignored
exclusive

the

basic tenet that the

That view
jury is the

judge of credibility of any and all witnesses.

(Section 78-21-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; State
supra,

and authorities cited at n.

State v. Tanner, supra.)

7 on 1234, and

Most trial practitioners are aware

of the "stock" expert witness credibility instruction to the
effect that the jury can choose to believe or disbelieve any
expert witness.

See e.g., DeVitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury

Practice and Instructions, Section 15.22 (3rd Ed., 1977).
Distinction between judicial notice of scientific facts
and the admissibility of scientific evidence must be carefully
maintained.
Appellant's proffer clearly shows that the level of acceptance
(competency)

now

supra)
P.2d

has

risen

to

a

"demonstrable stage."

See also State of Utah v. Rebeterano,

(Utah, 1984), Case No. 18428, filed April 30, 1984.
Sergeant Thirsk testified that he had conducted 261

polygraphs

(Tr.

1/13,

examinations on Ms.
Attorney's office

82);

that he conducted the polygraph

Sagars at

(_!,Q.

the

119-120);

request of

the County

that on prior occasions,

criminal cases were dismissed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's
office on

the basis of a polygraph alone

l.!.E.·

112-113); and
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that

blind scoring of

the Sergeant Th1rsk polygraph machine

tracings by two other police officers and an employee of Adult
Probation and Parole all scored Ms. Sagars deceptive.
Dr.
in

Kircher

testified that his doctoral degree was

the sub-specialty of experimental psychology and had the

qualifications, education and publications reflected in his
vitae, Defense Exhibit 46.

He recited the field and laboratory

studies achieving a reliability and accuracy
90% or more

1/13,

in the order of

5-11), and firmly stated that sound

scientific research produced no evidence whatsoever
deceptive person could defeat the test.

that a

(Id. 55)

The State offered no evidence or witness to refute
plaintiff's proffer of scientific acceptance.

The State chose

simply to question witnesses about possible biases, knowledge
of quoted passages contained

in various publications and

hypothetical questions.
Absent

evidence

evidentiary proffer must
inherently

improbable

improbability.

to
be

the

contrary,

taKen as

plaintiff's

true unless

it is so

judicial notice can be taken of its

Furthermore,

a ".

.failure to achieve the

standard of general acceptance need not freeze the evidentiary
development of the polygraph in view of its unique potential
as a tool of justice."
(3)
may

(Vitello, supra at 592)

Policy considerations or other exclusionary rules

limit otherwise relevant evidence.

(current Rules

402 and

702).)

The

(See Rule 7, U.R.E.

age-old "confusion and
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,teJudice to the jury" consideration has oft-times been cited

1

a

policy

supporting polygraph exclusion.
2nd Ed.

opinion.

1972 at 491)

(Tr. 1/13, 119-120)

Such was the trial court's

The weakness of an exclusion based

on that notion is amply demonstrated by the admissibility of
opinion

evidence

fingerprints,

in

the

following

areas:

ballistics,

radar guns, breathalizer, intoxilizer, paternity

based on blood analysis, arson or fire investigations, insanity
based on mental defect, voice analysis for identification, hair
sample analysis or battered child syndrome.

This list certainly

is not exhaustive and pointedly has failed to include character
evidence admitted under federal and state rules for many years.
See e.g., Federal Rules of Evidence 608, 1983, and Utah Rules
of Evidence 608,
in

formerly U.R.E.

supra,

".

46-47.

As noted by the Court

.fitting in the polygraph opinion will

require no alteration of these [character opinion] rules."

(350

F.Supp. at 96)
Opponents to the admission of opinion evidence based
upon polygraph examination have claimed such opinion invades
the province of the jury.

Such ignores the traditional role

of the jury as the ultimate finder of fact and presupposes the
jury will

place

undue

weight

on

such

opinion evidence

notwithstanding court

instructions.

traditional cleansing

role of cross-examination and expert

testimony of opposing parties.

Such also ignores the

This court so held in State

v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 123 (Utah, 1974), stating:
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When this evidence was received, it
had the same status as any other evidence;
that is, it was to be considered by the jury
in connection with all of the other evidence
in the case; and it was their prerogative
to give it whatever credibility they thought
it was entitled to.
(See Section 77-24-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953;
Chadwick, 25 P. 737, 7 Utah 134; and State
v. Scott, 447 P.2d 908, 22 U.2d 27.) -----rd:"

at-1234:-

--

The Court in
although supportive of

was a little more expansive,
the position stated by this Court,

reasoning in the following manner:
The argument that the jury will be
displaced by a machine or by a polygraph
examiner lacks merit.
The jury will make
the final determinaton of guilt or
innocence.
In this connection it is
important to understand how different juries
are today than they were when the restrictive
rules of evidence were first developed.
On the whole they read widely.
Largely
because of television they know generally
what is going on in the world.
Their
educational background is extensive. They
think.
They reason.
They are really very
good at sorting out good evidence from bad,
of separating the credible witness from the
incredible, and of disregarding experts who
attempt to inject their opinions into areas
of which they have little knowledge. They
would welcome all evidence having a bearing
on the problem they are deciding and the
give and take of deliberation would expose
weaknesses in any witness or evidence.
A
modern jury, that must deliberate, and must
agree, is the ideal body to evaluate opinions
of this kind.
The search for truth should
be enhanced, eliminating some cases in which
both sides agree there is no real issue,
and in other cases assisting the jury to
reach a just result.
supra, at
98.
More recently this Court in

supra,
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,e1terated the evidentiary impact of polygraph evidence, stating:
The defendant claims that the favorable
results of the polygraph test that she took
automatically raise a reasonable doubt as
to her guilt.
We do not agree.
The court
was not obligated to give more weight to
that evidence than to other evidence
presented.
The weight and credibility given
the evidence is decided by the finder of
fact, in this case, the court.
The court
did not err in basing its conclusions on
the other evidence before it.
We do not
hold that a favorable polygraph test raises
a reasonable doubt as a matter of law.
Id. at 551.
A thirdly-stated policy opposing admissibility of
polygraph-based opinion evidence is one decrying the consumption
of

time

at

trial.

To

say

such

is

even

a

valid policy

consideration in a death penalty case borders on the ludicrous,
and

to decry

trial

time

in a

death penalty case involving

relatively few witnesses and court time (approximately 11 trial
days all told)

probably creeps across the threshold.

The Court

will not relinquish power to control scope of examination and
cross-examination of experts by virtue of admitting polygraph
based opinion evidence.
less

than

one

day,

The proffer in the case at bar consumed
although

admittedly

the proffer

and

cross-examination was less extensive than rationally expected
had the jury been present.
Other policy considerations supporting admissibility
may be loosely grouped to
lb)

untrammeled

right

include

(a)

right of confrontation,

to produce exculpatory evidence,

latitude in impeachment or cross-examination,

(d)

(c)

widespread

4b

reliance of such opinion by law enforcement,
prosecutorial discretion

based on

(e)

exercise ot

polygraph opinion,

(f)

irrevocability of the death penalty allowing greater latitude
and

(g}

greater need in a single eyewitness prosecution.

These

are treated below.
(a)

The

right of confrontation is the mainstay of

our criminal process.

Guaranteed by Article I, Section 12 of

the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution,

the right of confrontation includes the

right to cross-examination.

380 U.S. 400,

13 L.Ed.2d 923, 85 s.ct. 1065 (1963))
In Smith v.
88 S.Ct.

748

Illinois,

(1968),

the

300 U.S. 129, 19 L.Ed.2d 956,

trial court erronesouly limited

defendant's cross-examination of the principal witness in a trial
which had as its sole issue the credibility of the prosecution
witness.

When credibility of one witness is the sole issue,

.prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place
the witness

in his proper setting and put the weight of his

testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury
cannot fairly appraise them . . . • "

(390 U.S. at 132, 19 L.Ed.2d

at 959 quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 75 L.Ed.
624,
F.2d

51 S.Ct.
458

218

(1931))

(7th Cir.,

See also

1981),

involving

743
a

polygraph

in a

"stipulation" state, n. 6 at 461.
Appellant was

similarly situated as

supra,

in that the Court made it abundantly clear on the record and
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"ff

of

the record that polygraph would not be mentioned in front
the

jury.

Effective cross-examination of Ms. Sagars was

precluded in that the setting, motivations and nature of her
statements could not be properly demonstrated.
cross-examinating Sergeant Thirsk,

In fact,

in

the prosecutor elicited

responses indicative of prior consistent statements made by Ms.
Sagars,

thereby compounding appellant's denial of effective

cross-examination or confrontation.
(b)

(See Tr. 1/12, 123-128.)

The untrammeled right to produce exculpatory

evidence in criminal defense should promote caution in limiting
in any way defendant's attempts to show a lack of culpability.
In United States v. Hart,

344 F.Supp.

522

(E.O.N.Y., 1971),

the court followed the lead of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 s.ct. 1194

(1963), and held:

The results of the tests which the
government had [the witness] take are
admissible on behalf of the defendant because
the government initially thought they were
reliable enough to assist it in evaluating
its witness.
344 F.Supp. at 524.
(c)

The

policy

of

allowing

wide

latitude

in

cross-examinations also supports the notion that proper areas
of

inquiry

may

motivations,

range

far

and wide

in showing

character or honesty of a witness.

the

bias,

Relevancy

parameters should be the only restriction.
(d)

Today's policy of widespread use of polygraphs

in law enforcement is further supportive of impeachment evidence

admissibility.

Evidence during appellant's proffer indicated

that the Salt Lake City Police Department employed at least three
polygraph examiners (Tr. 1/13, 86-91), and the County Attorney's
office at least one, Steve Bartlett,
the State.

named but not called by

Adult Probation and Parole also employs at least

one polygraph examiner.

Presumably decisions in the

(Ibid.)

law enforcement field are based, at least in part, upon the
opinions of such polygraph examiners.
(e)

The practice and policy of basing prosecutorial

decisions upon the results of polygraph examinations is well
known and supported in the record at Tr. 1/13, 111-113.

See

also Bailey and Rothblatt, Investigation and Preparation of
Criminal Cases Federal and State,
(f)

(Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1970).

Death penalty cases have engendered a policy of

greater

caution in limiting evidence.

442 U.S.

95,

60 L.Ed.2d 738, 99 S.Ct.

2150

(1979),

the Court

held that the hearsay rule could not bar evidence tending to
exculpate defendants in a death penalty case.

In

455 U.S. 104, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869

(1982),

the Court held that failure to consider defendant's unhappy
upbringing and emotional disturbance warranted reversal.

This

policy is treated hereafter as a substantive argument.
(g)
should

The policy in single accomplice-witness cases

be one of greater latitude in presenting credibility

evidence.

Until 1980 Utah law prohibited convictions based

solely on the

uncorroborated

testimony of

an accomplice.

(Section 77-17-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (prior
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1

-,

L980))

the

The 1980 amendment allowed such conviction and permits

trial

cautionary
evidence.

court

to give a

cautionary

instruction.

That

instruction should not ring hollow by excluding
(Appellant requested and received such a cautionary

instruction.

Although many facets of Ms. Sagars story were

corroborated, not one single piece of physical evidence actually
connected defendant to the scene of the crime.)
Since defendant proffered relevant scientific evidence
based upon a recognized,

substantive body of knowledge, it was

error of the trial court to exclude the evidence during the guilt
phase of the trial.
B. ANY EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION IS ADMISSIBLE
DURING THE PENALTY PHASE OF A CAPITAL CASE.
Appellant moved

in writing on January 19, 1983, for

the admission of polygraph evidence during the penalty phase
of the trial scheduled to commence on January 20, 1983.
at

281

Although

the Court denied

the motion,

Record

that denial

apparently was made without the benefit of a clear record,
1/20, 72)

but the position of the Court was made abundantly clear

on the record that,

in the trial court's opinion, polygraphs

had no place in the courtroom.

(Tr. 1/13, 119-120)

Objection

was again orally made on February 4, 1983, on the record.
2 , 4'

(Tr.

(Tr.

11)

Section 76-3-207 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended,

provided

for

relaxed evidentiary rules during the

penalty phase of a capital felony, stating:

(2)
In these sentenc1ny rroceedings,
evidence may be presented as to any matter
the court deems relevant to sentence,
including but not limited to the nature and
circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and
physical condition, and any other facts in
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.
of its admissibility under the exclusionary
rules of evidence.
The state's attorney
shall be permitted to
present argument for or against sentence
of death.
Aggravating circumstances shall
include those as outlined in 76-5-202.
Mitigation circumstances shall include the
following:

and-the-defendant

(a)
The defendant has no significant
history of prior criminal activity.

* * *
(g)
And any other fact
of the penalty.
Relaxation

of

in

evidentiary rules

is

the crux of

bifurcated guilt and penalty hearings as a means to avoid
prejudice
261

in the guilt phase.

(Utah, 1980),

See

607 P.2d

in which defendant objected to relaxation of

the evidentiary rules.
Appellant's
supra,

motion specifically cited

in which the death penalty was vacated because

the trial court had excluded during the penalty phase hearsay
evidence tending to exculpate defendant.
a

The statement was of

third person allegedly confessing to the actual shooting,

although the petitioner had already been found guilty.
held:

The Court

,[

:t
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Regardless of whether the proffered
testimony comes within Georgia's hearsay
rule, under the facts of this case its
exclusion constituted a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. 442 U.S. at 97, 60 L.Ed.2d
at 741.
-438 U.S.
s.Ct.

2954

(1978),

decided

shortly

586, 57 L.Ed.2d 973,
before

98

supra,

addressed the nagging question of what facts must be taken into
account at sentencing in capital cases.

The Court held:

.We conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of
capital case, not be precluded from
considering
any
aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for
a sentence less than death.
(Emphasis by
the Court.)
(Footnotes omitted.)
438 U.S.
at 604, 57 L.Ed.2d at 990.
The Court decided
L.Ed.2d 1010, 98 S.Ct.

2977

438 U.S.

637, 57

(1978), the same day as Lockett,

supra, and similarly concluded the Ohio death penalty statute
was constitutionally infirm because petitioner had been precluded
from presenting
permitted only
considered;
,lefendant' s

any factor
three

to wit:

in mitigation.

specified factors

Ohio's statute

in mitigation to be

(a) victim inducement or facilitation,

(b)

duress, coercion or strong provocation, and

(c)

mental defects not amounting to insantiy.

The statute allowed

the Court to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime
and the defendant.
The penalty of

death was again vacated in

supra,

because the ".

.sentence was imposed

without the type of individualized consideration of mitigating
factors.

.required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

in capital cases."

455 U.S.

at 105, 71 L.Ed.2d at 5,

citing Lockett v. Ohio, supra.)
Similar

to Utah's sentencing statute,

(Compare Section 76-3-207, Utah Code Annotated,
statute, Title 21, Section 701.10 (1980).)

the Oklahoma

to Oklahoma

The trial court had

found the aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and in mitigation considered only defendant's
youth but refused to consider his turbulent background.

The

Court held that evidence of a violent background was relevant
and required to be considered stating:
The sentencer.
.may determine the
weight to be given relevant mitigating
evidence. But they may not give it no weight
by excluding such evidence from their
consideration.
Footnote:
We note that the Oklahoma
death penalty statute permits defendant to
present evidence "as to any mitigation
circumstances."
Lockett requires the
sentencer to listen.
(Citation omitted.)
supra, 455 U.S. at 114-115, 71
11.
The case at bar presents a classic
exclusion of relevant evidence proffered by Tillman in mitigation
during the penalty phase.

The evidence had a tendency to show

deception by the State's chief witness and tended to support
appellant's theory of the case to the effect that the evidence
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c•Juld reasonably infer Ms. Sagars perpetrated the crime.
evidence clearly was ".

.any other fact in mitigation.

(Section 76-3-207 (2) (g),
sentencer

was

Utah Code Annotated)

required to listen.
748 P.2d 71

at

the

burden of

The

to which the

This Court's comments in

(Utah, 1982), although directed

proof during the penalty phase, still are

appropriate to the issue at bar:
Even if Soloman--like wisdom were
available in framing objective standards,
their whole purpose could be thwarted if
the governing procedural rules allowed the
sentencing body to impose the death penalty
in the face of evidence which creates a
reasonable or substantial doubt as to the
appropriatness of that penalty.
Id. at
81.
A procedural

rule should not thwart Mr. Tillman's

proffered evidence from reaching the sentencing body.
Since

the

jury was

not

apprised of all

relevant

evidence in mitigation, appellant is entitled, at minimum, to
a new penalty phase hearing.
IV
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A MEANINGFUL COMPARISON
OF A LIFE SENTENCE WITH THE DEATH PENALTY.
Section 76-3-208 (3),
',;upplement,
1

1983),

Utah Code Annotated,

(Pocket

requires the jury, in effect, to compare the

ifc sentence to the death sentence for a particular defendant.

That section provides:
(3)
The court or jury, as the case
may be, shall retire to consider the
penalty.
In all proceedings before a jury,
under this section, it shall be instructed

as to the punishment to be imposed upon a
unanimous verdict for death and that to be
imposed if a unanimous verdict for death
is not found.
If the jury reports unanimous
agreement to impose the sentence of death,
the court shall discharge the jury and shall
impose the sentence of death.
If the jury
is unable to reach a unanimous verdict
imposing the sentence of death, the court
shall discharge the jury and impose the
sentence of life imprisonment.
During argument,

appellant's counsel suggested a life

sentence for appellant might mean a sentence of some 15 to 20
years if appellant was ever paroled, which was highly unlikely.
State's counsel rejoined with,

.they

(Tr.

1/20, 92-93)

were

rotten and it took them 40 years to purge their souls.

Forty years,
mean.

11

not fifteen years as a life

(!2..

11 2 )

And

also,

"Can

you honestly

say

to

yourselves 15 years hence that a person showing the lack of
remorse Mr. Tillman has shown is going to be a better person
when he gets out • • .

(Id. 116}

Appellant's counsel attempted to demonstrate society's
interests would be adequately served with a life sentence and
State's counsel used the "door" so opened to minimize the meaning
of a life sentence.

The jury was now pointedly asked to compare

penalties of a different magnitude;

to wit:

death versus 15

years!
With the luxury of hindsight, the foregoing comparsion
appears

as

a monstrous error.

A life

sentence means

an

indeterminate sentence of five years up to life imprisonment.
(Section 76-3-203(1), Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended)
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rhe

Board of Pardons decides the time and conditions for release,

1 (

any.

See generally Chapter 27 of Title 77, Utah Code

Annotated,

(Pocket Supplement as amended in 1983).

Presently

the Utah State Prison houses murderers who have been incarcerated
for almost 20 years without parole dates.

(Messrs. Lance and

Kelbach come to mind, perhaps others have been incarcerated as
long.)

The Parole Board's obligaton and function is to assess

the threat to society in determining appropriate parole dates,
and in certain cases, invite the attendance of victims, their
families or law enforcement officials.
Code Annotated)

(Section 77-27-3, Utah

For the jury to be informed a life sentence

meant fifteen years caused the penalty of death to become more
likely.

Had the jury been instructed a life sentence in a

capital case meant an actual sentence for life for

this

particular defendant, or that appellant would not be released,
if at all, unless an independent board designed to expertly rule
on such matters concluded society would not be threatened by
such release, the outcome may have been different.
Reasonable minds obviously would view the balancing
process undertaken by this jury for some seven hours as being
substantially influenced by a more accurate definition of a life
sentence under Utah law.

Defendant-appellant should have

the benefit of all favorable facts and inferences
tending to influence the finder of fact.

(See cases cited in

Section III B, infra, re admissibility of polygraph results at
penalty phase.)
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Although obJection was riot concurrently made, appellant
moved

for

a

new

trial on

the gLounds

the

jury could

not

rationally compare the death penalty to a life sentence when
the life sentence was undefined.
Arrest of Judgment,

(Tr.

Record at 357-358.)

2/4 at 8 and Motion in
Even though objection

is not technically preserved, this Court has reviewed the record
for

error

in a capital case.

648 P.2d 71

(Utah, 1982))

Review for possible error, even though not raised

on

argued,

appeal or

may be undertaken by
3 U.2d 230,

327

(1955)

and

the Court sua
282 P.2d 323 at

78 Utah 350,

2 P.2d 1050

(1931))
The impermissible shift from "life" to fifteen years
modified and effected the penalty choice submitted to the jury
and therefore entitles appellant to an order remanding the case
for new penalty phase proceedings.

v
THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE
CRIME, THE IMMUNITY GRANTED THE ACCOMPLICE AND
THE SENTENCES METED OUT IN SIMILAR CASES.
A.

The victim received

a number of blows to the head and died of asphyxiation due to
a fire.
134-136)

The blows probably would have been fatal.

(Tr. 1/4,

The victim was rendered unconscious by the first blow.

(Tr. 1/6, 308-310)
It is this court's professed duty to determine whether
the sentence of death is disproportionate to the crime.
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648 P.2d 71

(Utah, 1982)

572 P.2d 1338
held,

inter alia,

upon the

at 77 and 80 citing State

(Utah, 1977))

(648 P.2d at 85-86)

under Utah law,

this court

that the lack of constitutional limitations

aggravating circumstances

procedure.

In Wood,

flawed

the sentencing

The Court stated that " • • •

'ruthlessness and brutality,' as an agravating

factor, must be limited to those murders involving an aggravated
battery or torture."

(Citing State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343

(Utah,

8 6)

1977))

(.!__<:]_.

This

holding

application of Godfrey v. Georgia,
398, 100 s.ct. 1759

resulted

446 U.S.

from

the

420, 64 L.Ed.2d

(1980), cited in Wood, supra.

The United States Supreme Court recently held that
the Eighth Amendment did not

invariably require a

se

comparative proportionality although statutory schemes which
require

comparative proportionality review have

constitutional approval.
7 9 L • Ed . 2 d
However,

29 ,

l 0 4 s • ct •

received

U.S.
3 4 c r . L • Rp tr • 3 0 2 7

( 19 8 4) )

"proportionality" in the traditional sense

(i.e.,

gravity of offense and severity of penalty, sentences for other
crimes and sentencing practices in other jurisdictions) is still
the guiding standard in interpreting the "cruel and unusual"
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.

(Id. 79 L.Ed.2d

at 35)

Section

76-1-104,

Utah Code Annotated,

applies

principles of construction to the Code and specifically provides
for proportionate sentencing.

It states:

76-1-104.
Purposes and principles of
construction.
The provisions of this code
shall be construed in accordance with these
general purposes.
(]) Forbid and prevent the commission of
offenses;
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental
state which constitute each offense and
safeguard conduct that is without fault from
condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are
proportionate to the seriousness of offenses
and which permit recognition or differences
in rehabilitation possibilities among
individual offenders.
(4) Prevent aribtrary or oppressive treatment
of persons accused or convicted of offenses.
Section 76-3-206,
amended,
Such

Utah Code Annotated,

1953,

as

requires "automatic review" of all death sentences.

review had

been

interpreted

to

include

proportionality review,
Andrews, 574 P.2d 209,

traditional

supra;

(1977).

This court in

572 P.2d 1338

(1977), applied

proportionality review stating:
The circumstances of the offenses and
the defendant's participation in them.
• we
believe, created
We therefore
reject this argument of disproportionality
as inconsistent with the obvious facts.
(Emphasis added)
Id. at 1355.
The

above-stated

conclusion

is

a

profound

understatement of the events recounted by a survivor of that
tragedy.

In comparison appellant Tillman's conduct in this crime

as recounted by Carla Sagars simply cannot be equated to the
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"cruelty, terror and atrocity" cited above.
did not rise to the level of ".
crimes.

Appellant's conduct

.extreme and unusually serious

(emphasis added)

before imposition of the ultimate sanction.

(Id. 1356) required
The men in Utah

currently under a sentence of death (excluding appellant) consist
of individuals who have committed multiple homicides of almost
incredible magnitude, the gruesome details of which this court
and the general public have been informed by the news media and
appellate review.
those cases,

Without reviewing the undisputed facts of

(one of which has yet to be reviewed by this court),

it can be concluded that appellant's crime is unextraordinary
and that appellant's sentence of death is disproportionate,
factually and legally, to the crime.

There was no torture nor

The initial assault resulted

extended personal confrontation.

in unconsciousness and death followed shortly thereafter.

No

other victims were directly involved.
B.

to Accomplice Sentence.

Carla

Sagars testified she stalked the victim, provided information,
purchased guns, plotted various impossible schemes, committed
a n11mber of felonies while employed at the U.S. Bureau of
Prisons,

aided and abetted the actual homicide by personal

participation and received complete and full immunity although
sne had already voluntarily confessed to her complicity in the
offense.

(See generally Tr.

1/6,

191

to Tr.

1/7,

512,

inclusive.)
Proportionality review in other jurisdictions have
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included comparison to accompl1ce sentences.

.Y.!._Q.!.1:1:2.!!•
,

34 Cal.3d 441,

3 3 9 So . 2 d

(1978),

18 6

668 P.2d 697

(F1 a . ,

See e.g., People

(1983),

1 9 7 6 ) , c e r t . den .

4 39 U• S .

991

wherein that court compared the life sentence imposed

upon the accomplice with the death sentence of appellant who
was the dominating figure in the felony-murder, stating:
We are extremely sensitive to the
demands of equality before the law in cases
in which we must consider whether a sentence
of death should be upheld.
Our reading of
408 U.S. 238 (1972),
.convinces us that identical crimes
committed by people with similar criminal
histories require identical sentences.
Id. at 192.
Appellant in the case at bar does not argue Ms. Sagars
should be given the death penalty--there are obvious differences
in circumstances,

history and claimed complicity--however,

appellant strenuously urges this court to compare the incredibly
diverse treatment of the two parties to the crime.
The prevalent practice in modern criminal prosecutions
involves wide-spread use of "snitches" or immunized witnesses.
This

practice,

coupled

Corroboration Rule

with

repeal

of

the

Accomplice

(Section 77-17-7, Utah Code Annotated, as

amended in 1980) certainly has facilitated criminal prosecutions,
but by the same token has heightened the potential for
in the

"race

abuse

to the courthouse." The first one of multiple

co-defendants to "confess" and blame the others from the witness
stand generally emerges
freedom,

unscathed,

victorious

(in terms of

fees, new job or identity, lesser criminal record) and,
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1,.)t

with

incidentally, typically immune from being shown deceptive
respect

to

the details of the crime itself or the

comparative complicity of the slower-footed defendant at trial.
The case at bar typifies the extreme result of the confessor
to a homicide avoiding all sanctions and the non-confessor
receiving

the

sanction.

The disproportionate

treatment between the two participants is the product of
arbitrariness and caprice-procribed in Fuhrman v. Georgia,
408 u.s. 238 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 s.ct. 2726 (1972), and prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 9, Utah Constitution.

The Court should vacate

the penalty of death as patently disproportionate to the full
immunity granted the accomplice.
C.

of Sentence to Similar Cases.

(Comparative proportionality.)

Defendant attempted to introduce

affidavit evidence during the penalty phase to the effect that
a number of previously-tried capital homicide cases in Salt Lake
County resulted in life sentences.

The motions and affidavits

are at pages 289-332 of the record on appeal.

The Court barred

introduction of the evidence before the jury but permitted the
same to be filed as part of the court record.

(Tr. 1/20, 72)

This Court has previously ruled the automatic review
of capital cases includes review of proportionality of the
sentence.

(Subsection A, supra, and cases there cited)

Although

comparative proportionality review is not mandated by Federal
Constitutional Standards,

the practice has been lauded and

occassionally applied.
cited)

This Court has not specifically ruled that comparative

proportionality review is to be performed; however, it has stated
that:
.we believe that this state's system
meets the constitutional tests because it
is structured to provide reasonably that
the unique and irretrievable sanction of
death will be mandated by its provisions
and processes only in extreme and unusually
serious and shocking crimes.
State
v. Pierre, supra, 572 P.2d at 1356.
Subsequently,

in Pierre v. Morris,

and Andrews v. Morris,

607 P.2d 812

607 P.2d 816

(Utah,

(Utah, 1980)

1980)

this Court

held that comparative review could not be raised in a subsequent
Rule 65 B(i), U.R.C.P., proceeding because such review was deemed
a matter of law and Utah's statute was constitutional "on its
face."

814)

In Andrews v. Morris, supra,

this Court

adopted the rationale of Spinkellink v.
582

(5th Cir., 1978), cert. den.,

prohibited

comparison

of

578 F.2d

440 U.S. 976

every decision,

(1979), which
trial,

juror,

prosecutor, etc.
Appellant does not request comparative proportionality
review

in the manner

rejected in

supra,

but he reasonably and simply asserts that comparison of his case
to the death penalty cases

Qf

without more would

clearly demonstrate other crimes much more vicious,

inhumane

or reprehensible and that appellant's crime more nearly parallels
the crimes of

those

not given

the

death penalty.

Section

63
/b-1-104(3)

and

(4),

Utah Code Annotated,

mandates such

comparison.
Appellant further asserts the trial court erred in
excluding the affidavits proffered by defendant.
would have allowed
informed manner.

the

jury to compare sentences in a more

That is,

the jury could then decide whether

the crime in question was an ".

." crime.

and shocking.

The affidavits

.extreme and unusually serious

Extreme compared to what?

Unusual

compared to the "usual"?
Prohibition of
Tillman the

right

the

factual comparison denied Mr.

to present

"any evidence in mitigation"

mandated by Section 76-3-207 of the Utah Code and the right to
due process of

law.

Prohibition of

a

factual

comparison

eradicates the mechanism which would insure that " • • • the law
.[is]

applied,

manner."

in all cases, in a judicious and even-handed

(State v. wood,

supra,

648 P.2d at BO;

The sentence

in this case cannot be considered "even-handed" when compared
to sentences imposed in cases addressed by the affidavits on
file herein,
torture,

including State v. Hansen,

(one homicide perhaps

another homicide attempted, disfigurement, etc.); State
(same

as

Hansen);

(multiple

nornicide of prominent businessman and his wife under numerous
hJgravating circumstances by youthful defendant);
(drug store proprietor murdered during a robbery in
front

of

two

witnesses,

defendant on parole)

(homicide to prevent identification by an unresisting

cab driver, defendant notched gun and bragged about deed); State
v. Franklin,
motives,

(multiple homicide of two black joggers for racial

prior

felonies

by defendant);

(machine-gun killing of a witness during an aggravated kidnapping
-

no

criminal

history,

no

imbalance); State v. Stark,

torture,

possible emotional

(the killing of a state trooper

by an 18-year old parolee);

State v. Kanusky,

(involved a

torture killing by a defendant with a criminal history).

On

the other side of the coin, death sentences were imposed in
supra,

supra,

and

Salt Lake County District Court,
homicides.

The cases of

CR-83-1314,

all alleging multiple

supra,

and

supra,

had the penalty of death vacated.
The sentence of death

in this particular case is

disproportionate to the unextraordinary crime of which appellant
stands

convicted.

The

sentence of death

is arbitrary,

capricious, and therefore disproportionate to the distinctly
cavalier treatment of the accomplice.

The sentence of death

in this case is freakish and disproportionate to the sentences
of other individuals convicted of multiple killings,

torture

killings or other cruel homicides and fails to equate to those
sentenced to death in Utah for multiple and atrocious killings.
This Court should vacate the death
imposition of a life sentence.

penalty and remand for
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VI
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IS INFIRM BECAUSE IT
IS BASED ON A DUPLICITOUS INFORMATION.
The Information charged appellant with Murder in the
First Degree, a Capital Offense based upon the felony-murder
(Record at 17)

rule.

was amended

At preliminary hearing the Information

to allege

the

underlying felonies of burglary,

aggravated burglary or arson or aggravated arson (Record at 17),
thereby permitting the jury to find guilt and/or impose the
sentence of death

upon

two classifications of

felonies.

Appellant complained of such duplicity in his motion in arrest
of judgment filed January 28, 1983.
was argued on February 4,

1983,

(Record at 34)
(Tr.

2/4, 5-8)

The Motion
and denied.

(Id. 21)
Appellant also submitted jury instruction in which
the felony-murder rule theory was expressed only in terms of
burglary or aggravated burglary.

(Record at 156, Cf. 157)

The

Court may take notice of an error even though lacking formal
exception to jury instruction.

See State v. Dubois, 98 P.2d

354 (Utah, 1940); State v. Peterson, 240 P.2d 504 (Utah, 1952).
In

574 P.2d 709

(Utah, 1977), the

Court addressed issues even though not raised on appeal of a
capital case.

710)

a mere failure

to object does not bar standing.

616 P.2d 628
The

When fundamental rights are involved,

(Wash., 1980))

law relative to duplicity may be summarized by
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quoting the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Starks,
515 F.2d 112 (1975) at 116-117:
Duplicity is the joining in a single
count of two or more distinct and separate
offenses.
One vice of duplicity is that
a general verdict for a defendant on that
count does not reveal whether the jury found
him not guilty of one crime or not guilty
of both.
Conceivably, this could prejudice
the defendant in protecting himself against
double jeopardy.
Another vice of duplicity
is that a general verdict of guilty does
not disclose whether the jury found the
defendant guilty of one crime or of both.
Conceivably, this could prejudice the
defendant in sentencing and in obtaining
appellate review. A third vice of duplicity
is that it may prejudice the defendant with
respect to evidentiary rulings during the
trial, since evidence admissible on one
offense might be inadmissible on the other.
Joining conspiracy and substantive offenses
in the same count present this vice in a
particularly aggravated form, because of
the admissibility of declarations made by
co-conspirators.
Assuming such a joinder,
and a general guilty verdict, there would
ordinarily be no way of discerning whether
the jury found the defendant guilty of the
offense in proof of which such
co-conspirator's admissions were properly
admitted.
Finally, there is no way of
knowing with a general verdict on two
separate offenses joined in a single count
whether the jury was unanimous with respect
to either.
(515 F.2d at 116-117)
In

the defendants therein were charged with

conspiracy and attempt to violate the Hobbs Act
Section 1951)

(18

through acts of robbery and extortion.

u.s.c.A.
The Court

overturned the conviction because of duplicity.
A general verdict predicated upon two alternative
grounds must be set aside if one of the grounds is infirm.
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In
512,

v. California,

75 L.Ed.

convicted

1117,

of

73 A.L.R.

violating

a

484

flag

283 U.S.

359, 51 S.Ct.

(1931), a communist was

statute

which had

three

definitional clauses, one of which was held unconstitutional.
Since

the general verdict could have been predicated on the

unconstitutional portion of the statute, the verdict was vacated.
In accord
77 s.ct.

1064, l

is Yates v. United States,

L.Ed.2d 1356

354 U.S.

298,

(1957), another communist party

case in which the Court followed the rule of Stromberg, supra,
stating:
.we think the proper rule to be
applied is that which requires a verdict
to be set aside in cases where the verdict
is supportable on one ground, but not on
another, and it is impossible to tell which
ground the jury selected.
(Citation
omitted.) 354 U.S. at 311, l L.Ed.2d at 1371.
Recently,

the United States Supreme Court addressed

the application of the Stromberg rule to sentencing procedures
in a death penalty case.
103 S.Ct.

In Zant v. Stephens,

U.S.

, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), Stephens, the respondent,

was convicted of murder and sentenced to death after the Georgia
jury had

found

inference)

the existence of

two

(or

perhaps

three by

statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which

was later held invalid.

Although the conviction was affirmed

on a harmless-error rule application, the Court reaffirmed the
viability of

and specifically noted that a different

result might be obtained when the penalty phase requires the
finder

of

fact

to

weigh

the aggravating and mitigating
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u. s.

circumstances.
sheets))

77 L.Ed.2d at 258

(advance

Utah law requires such "weighing" procedures.

(State

v. Wood, supra)
The case at bar is fundamentally identical with
v. Green, supra, in which the defendant allegedly murdered a
rape-kidnapping victim.

The felony-murder rule was invoked based

on either a rape or a kidnapping.

On appeal, the Court held

that there was insufficient evidence of kidnapping; and inasmuch
as it was "

.impossible for

us to know if the jury was

unanimous in determining whether aggravated first degree murder
was committed in the furtherance of kidnapping or rape.
(emphasis by the court)
remanded.

631), the case was reversed and

The jury had been instructed that they could find

first degree murder if the homicide was in furtherance of a rape
or a kidnapping, without requiring the jury to specify which
alternate ground or both grounds were the underlying felony.
Upon a second review, the Court concluded that kidnapping had
not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that therefore
the required unanimity was lacking.

Some jurors could have

relied upon the kidnapping and others relied on the rape to
conclude guilt of felony-murder.
The case at bar is strikingly similar to
Green, supra.

Appellant herein was convicted of felony-murder

under two distinct types of felonies

(each subdivided into

aggravated and non-aggravated forms), either one or both felonies
being infirm because the felony merged into or was included
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, thin

the homicide as argued in Point VII,

f,dlowing.

immediately

Even if not merged or included, there is no way to

tell if the jury was unanimous because of duplicity.

It is still

impossible to tell whether the jury was unanimous in finding
the murder occurred

in the commission of a burglary or an

arson.
VII

A CAPITAL CONVICTION CANNOT BE OBTAINED UNDER
THE FELONY-MURDER RULE WHEN THE FELONY IS
MERGED OR INCLUDED IN THE MURDER ITSELF.
Appellant moved,

pre-trial,

to quash or reduce the

Information on the grounds that a lesser-included offense could
not constitute one of the dual prongs of the felony-murder rule.
(Record at 68-91 and 121-130)
support of his motion for

He asserted similar grounds in

a new trial

requested instructions aimed at this point.

(Record at 357) and
(Record at 156-157)

The Information charged Capital Homicide based on felony-murder,
Section 76-5-202 (1) (d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The felonies alleged were burglary, aggravated burglary, arson
or aggravated arson.
The

facts

relevant

substantially disputed.
purpose for
hum1c1de.

to

these motions

are not

Ms. Sagars testified that the sole

entry into the victim's home was to commit a

(Tr.

491-492)

She also testified that the victim's

bed was set on fire to finish (at her advice) or hide the murder,
(Tr. 1/7, 488-493)

The jury was instructed according to the

statutory definitions of burglary, aggravated burglary, arson

and aggravated arson

(Record

at

elements of the felony-murder rule.
The

felony-murder

197,

as well as the

(Record at 194)

rule

76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated,

198),

is

set forth

1953, as amended

in Section
(prior to the

1983 amendments):
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
first degree if the actor intentionally and
knowingly causes the death of another under
any of the following circumstances:

* * *
(d)
The homicide was committed while
the actor was engaged in the commission of,
or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit,
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, forcible
sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault,
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary,
burglary, aggravated kidnapping or
kidnapping.
The

statute

was

amended

post-trial

to

include

additional felonies within the felony-murder rule as well as
other changes.
In People v. Moran,

246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927),

Justice Cardozo succinctly

stated appellant's position as

follows:
The felony that eliminates the quality
of the intent must be one that is independent
of the homicide and of the assault merged
therein, as e.g. robbery or larceny or
burglary or rape.
Id. 158 N.E. at 36
To require otherwise would mean
homicide,

not

".

. that every

justifiable or excusable, would occur

commission of felony,

with the result that

in the

intent to kill anc
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Jeliberation and

premeditation would never be essential."

( l bid.)
403 P.2d 540
defendant was charged

(Ariz.,

1965),

and convicted of first degree murder

pursuant to the felony-murder rule on the grounds the defendant
feloniously
death.

assaulted

his wife with a gun resulting in her

On appeal the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the act

of assault merged into the resultant homicide.

The assault could

not be deemed a "separate and independent offense which could
support a conviction for

felony murder."

at 545 citing

People v. Moran, supra)
Of

similar

import is State v. Branch,

415 P.2d 766

(Ore., 1966), wherein the issue on appeal was the propriety of
a "felony-murder"

instruction when the only felony was the

included assault with a dangerous weapon.
case contended that ".

The state in that

.the felony need not be a collateral

one, but that any included felony to entitle the state to an
instruction on felony murder."
disagreed,
felonies.

767)

The Court flatly

distinguishing collateral felonies from included

For example, a felonious assault upon a police officer

resulting

in

relony-murder;

the

death

of

an

intervening citizen is a

however, absent intervention, the death of a

police officer, without more,

is not a felony-murder.

(Utah's

present statute has elevated homicide of a public official to
a capital
Supplement.)

offense.

Section

76-5-202,

Vol.

8C,

Pocket

7 '

The California court addressed the issue to
70 Cal.2d

522,

75 Cal.Rptr.

188, 450 P.2d 580

(1969), wherein the court reversed a felony-murder conviction
in which the underlying felony was assault with a deadly weapon.
The

court

ruled

that

the

felony-murder

doctrine

has no

application to situations wherein the felony portion of the rule
cons is ts of

the

f e 1 on i o us ass au 1 t

upon the victim,

"

.

.a

category which includes the great majority of all homicides."
(450 P.2d at 590)
to void
felony

The California court adopted the doctrine

bootstrapping by the prosecution in cases where the
is

".

part of the homicide and which

the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense
included
omitted,

within

the offense charged."

(Footnote

first emphasis added, second emphasis by the Court.)
With respect to felony-murder based on a burglary,

the court overruled (to the extent inconsistent with the opinion)
two prior cases which had permitted
felony-murder

".

.a first

degree

instruction based upon a burglary as to which the

intended felony is the homicide itself of an offense included
therein."

(Id. 450 P.2d at 590-591)
In

462 P.2d 22
bar;

1 Cal. 3d 4 31, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494,
(1969),

the court addressed the precise issue at

to-wit: Whether the felony-murder rule could be supported

by burglary as the underlying felony when the purpose of entry
was to commit an assault upon the murdered occupant.
held that a conviction for

The court

felony-murder cannot be based upor
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,

Here the prosecution sought to apply
the felony-murder rule on the theory that
the homicide occurred in the course of a
burglary, but the only basis for finding
a felonious entry is the intent to commit
and assault with a deadly weapon.
When,
as here, the entry would be non-felonious
but for the intent to commit the assault,
and the assault is an integral part of the
homicide and is included in fact in the
offense charged, utilization of the
felony-murder rule extends that doctrine
'beyond any rational function that it is
designed to serve'.
We have heretofore
emphasized 'that the felony-murder doctrine
expresses a highly artificial concept that
deserves no extension beyond its required
application."
(People v. Phillips, (1966),
supra, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225,
232, 414 P.2d 353, 360)
'The purpose of the felony-murder rule
is to deter felons from killing negligently
or accidentally by holding them strictly
responsible for killings they commit.'
(1965), 62 Cal.2d
777, 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d
130, 133)
Where a person enters a building
with an intent to assault his victim with
a deadly weapon, he is not deterred by the
felony-murder rule.
The doctrine can serve
its purpose only when applied to a felony
independent of the homicide.
In Ireland,
we reasoned that a man assaulting-another
with a deadly weapon could not be deterred
by the second degree felony-murder rule,
since the assault was an integral part of
the homicide.
Here, the only distinction
is that the assault and homicide occurred
inside a dwelling so that the underlying
felony is burglary based on an intention
to assault with a deadly weapon, rather than
simply assault with a deadly weapon.
(Id •
462 P.2d at 28)

1e

4,

at

ec

ur'

por

predicated upon assaultive intent, stating:

The California Supreme Court
164

Cal.Rptr.

1,

609

P.2d

468

(1980)

in
again

reviewed

the

Ir, tr1at casP, the defendant forced his wife

felony-murder rule.

to a secluded area, caused her to disrobe and killed her some
20-30 minutes later.

Defendant took the clothes and personal

valuables of the victim.

He admitted to sexual intercourse

immediately prior to the murder.
The State charged Green with capital murder alleging
that the homicide was committed
the robbery;

and

(1) during the commission of

(2) during the commission of a kidnapping.

Finding the felony-murder applied predicated on the robbery,
the jury imposed death.
that a murder

On appeal the court reversed, holding

is not committed during a robbery within the

meaning of the statute unless the accused has "killed in cold
blood in order to advance an independent, felonious purpose;
e.g.,

[has] "carried out an execution-style slaying of the victim

of or witness to a holdup, a kidnapping or a rape."
505)

(609 P.2d

A special circumstance allegation of murder committed

during a robbery has not been established where the accused's

(609 P.2d at 505)

The Court concluded:

In the case at hand, for example, it
would not rationally distinguish between
murderers to hold that this defendant can
be subjected to the death penalty because
he took his victim's clothing for the purpose
o f
b u r n i n g
i t
1 a t e r
t o
p r e ve n t
identification, when another defendant who
committed an identical first degree murder
could not be subjected to the death penalty
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if for the same purpose he buried the victim
fully clothed--or even if he doused the
clothed body with gaoline and burned it at
the scene instead.
To permit a jury to
choose who will live and who wil die on the
basis of whether in the course of committing
murder the defendant happens
constitutes robbery__.2.!._Qne o!
the other listed felonies would be to revive
'the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action' condemned by the high court plurality
l!l_Greg;i.
(428 U.S. at p. 189, 96 S.Ct. at
p. 2932)
We conclude that regardless of
w1th1n the meaning of the statute.
(Emphasis added.)
(Ibid.)
In
883

(1980),

v. Thompson, 165 Cal.Rptr. 898, 166 P.2d
decided

three months after

supra,

the

defendant was convicted of first degree murder, robbery and first
burglary, all arising out of an incident technically
involving robbery and burglary but in which the primary goal
was a homicide.

The penalty was death.

The court stated at page 894:
The question presented under People
v. Green is whether the shootings were done
to-advance an independent felonious purpose
of stealing the car and keys or whether
instead such intended thefts were 'merely
incidental to the murder.'
Viewing the
record as a whole in the light most favorable
to the jury's verdicts, as this court must,
it is impossible to conclude that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proof
on this issue.
The perpetrator's final remark to his
victims as he held the pillow in front of
his gun--' you know why I'm here and you know
who sent me'--undeniably indicates that this
confrontation was intended primarily {if
not exclusively) to be a killing. The man's

7h

refusal without apparent reason to accept
any of the victim's jewelry strongly imports
that property gain was at most secondary
importance.
As

in

and

supra,

the

of Carla Sagars and the appellant was to kill
the victim with the hatchet or axe, and the fire was
incidental to the murder because the fire was set to conceal
the .er imary er ime

(murder).

In fact,

the testimony of Carla

Sagars clearly shows that it was her desire to set the fire and
to put cigarette butts around the fire area to make it look like
the victim had been smoking in bed and the death caused by
accidental means.
felony-murder rule;

(Tr. 1/6, 488-49 3)

The application of the

i.e., increasing the degree of the crime

from second degree murder to first degree murder by virtue of
the abortive intent to destroy the crime scene with an arson,
is plainly prohibited and, as stated in Qreen, "would revive
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action condemned
by the high court plurality
The other aggravating circumstance alleged in the
Information,

to-wit:

burglary or aggravated burglary, is

similarly incidental to the homicide.

The entry into the

victim's home was made solely for the purpose of carrying out
the
to kill.

criminal goal of Carla Sagars and the appellant
In Thom.eson, the killer entered the victims'

home

armed with a gun and shot his two victims and used the ruse of
robbery to cover his primary motive; i.e., that he was sent tc
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lie

victims'

Jn
1

ntent

home to kill them, not to steal their property.

the killer entered the apartment with felonious
(a burglary)

to commit an assault upon the decedent.

There is no question here that if the victim had not died, Carla
Sagars and the appellant would be guilty of aggravated burglary
because they did enter the residence, caused physical injury
to the victim and were armed with a deadly weapon.

However,

the crimes of burglary or aggravated burglary were "merely
incident to the murder"

supra), and

secondary to the primary criminal goal of murder.

The State

has elected to charge murder in the first degree, a capital
felony, alleging that the homicide was committed "during the
commission" of a burglary, aggravated burglary, arson or
aggravated arson when in fact the reverse has been shown; i.e.,
that the burglary and/or arson was committed "during the
commission" of a homicide and was secondary to the E.£lmary
criminal goal of homicide.
Burglary is a completed offense the moment entry is
made with the requisite felonious intent.
Utah Code Annotated)
1981),

(Section 76-6-202,

In State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah,

the court upheld a burglary conviction based purely on

enttf with an inferred felonious intent.
Once the offense of burglary is completed, the homicide
cannot have occurred "in the commission of" the burglary as
required by the felony-murder rule.

Mere temporal proximity

ought not to elevate the homicide to a capital offense.

(See

generally 58 A.L.R.3d 851, Felony-MurdPr Rule, "Termination of
Felony", p. 851-987, for extensive discussion.)

The United

States Supreme Court may decide the issue in Murphy v. Texas,
cert. granted 35 C.L. 4067.
For the foregoing reasons, the capital conviction in
this case cannot be supported by the felony-murder rule charged
in the Information when the underlying felony or felonies were
either completed, merged into the homicide or included in fact
in the homicide.

The evidence and the law can only permit, at

most, a conviction of Second Decree Murder, first degree felony.
The Court should reverse and remand for imposition of the
appropriate sentence.
VIII
SECTION 76-3-207, U.C.A., IS CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO LIMIT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
AND PERMITS THE JURY TO RELY ON ANY FACTS IN AGGRAVATION.
Prior to commencement of penalty proceedings, the State
filed a notice of intent to introduce aggravating factors during
penalty phase including prior felony convictions, parole status,
prior incarcerations and statutory aggravating circumstances
based on the felony-murder rule of Section 76-5-202(d), Utah
Code

Annotated,

1953,

as

amended

(as

of

trial

date).

Defendant-appellant filed a notice prior to the penalty phase
to

the effect he would not seek to rely on lack of criminal

history in mitigation and objected verbally to introduction of
conviction evidence.
Witnesses

(Tr. 1/20, 14 and 68)
for

the

State

testified

concerning
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prior criminal convictions and appellant's parole
status at the time of the offense.

(Tr. 1/20, 5-20)

At commencement of the penalty phase,

the Court

instructed the jury in almost the precise language of the
sentencing statute

(Section 76-3-207, Utah Code Annotated) that

any evidence having probative force may be received regardless
of its admissibility.

(Tr. 1/20, 2-3)

The typed instructions

tendered to the jury (Record at 268) and read to them (Tr. 1/20,
73) also advised the jury that any facts in aggravation could
be presented.
at

270)

(Instruction No. 4)

then stated

Instruction No. 6 (Record

"You may consider

circumstances the

as

aggravating

which you found to be present
as elements of the offense of

first-degree murder in the guilt phase."
And also Instruction No. 7,

(Record at 271)

(Emphasis added.)
"You may consider

as aggravating circumstances any other evidence admitted at
trial • . . and any other facts in aggravation . • . . "
Section 76-3-207 provides,

in pertinent part, as

follows:
In these proceedings, evidence may be
presented as to any matter the court deems
relevant to sentence, including but not
limited to the nature and circumstances of
the crime, the defendant's character,
background, history, mental and physical
condition, and any other facts in aggravation
or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence
the court deems to have probative force may
be received regardless of its admissibility
under the exclusionary rules of evidence.
Aggravating circumstances shall
include those as outlined in 76-5-202.

Section 76-5--202,

Lr>fet1ed

le,

in

the quoted statute,

is the substantive Murder tn tile Fust 1)eqree statute under which
appellant was charged with felony-murder as the aggravating
circumstance.
The jury did not specify which one or more aggravating
circumstances it relied upon as grounds for
death penalty.

imposition of

(See Point VI, infra, re duplicity.)

Allowing a jury to determine whether to impose the
death penalty on the basis of "any facts in aggravation" clearly
violates

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
i n r i.sJ:l! , 6 6 1 F . 2 d 5 6 ( 5 th

S t a t e s Co n s t i t u t i o n .
Cir., 1981), reh.
1114,

686 F.2d 311

(1982), cer. granted 457 U.S.

73 L.Ed.2d 1326, 102 S.Ct. 2922

(1983)

In Henry the

Fifth Circuit Court held that the consideration of non-statutory
aggravating circumstances required another sentencing procedure
when the initial sentencing procedure involved jury instructions
similar to the case at bar.

For

the

jury to consider any

aggravating circumstance violated the mandates of Fuhrman v.
Georgia, supra, and its progeny.
A different statutory scheme subject to the same
infirmity was

involved

in Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067

(5th Cir., 1982), reh. den. 688 F.2d 395
jury was not limited
circumstances.
Cir., 1982).

(1982), wherein the

in its consideration of aggravating
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To the extent Section 76-3-207, Utah Code Annotated,
as amended, permits the jury to consider "any other facts
in aggravation,"
it fails

the statute is constitutionally infirm because

to adequately".

.channel the sentencing decision

patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary
and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in
Fuhrman could occur."

428 U.S. 153 at 195

n. 46, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909
Not only was the
on any other fact

(1976))

jury instructed that it could rely

in aggravation,

but it was also instructed

that the aggravating circumstance of felony-murder, upon which
they could rely to impose the death penalty,
found to exist beyond a
other hand,

reasonable doubt.

had already been

Appellant, on the

sought to limit introduction of prior convictions

of defendant via a notice of intent not to claim lack of criminal
history in mitigation.
The

total

effect of the

instructions was one which

virtually mandated death unless the appellant was able to step
forward

to give a compelling reason why the death penalty should

0.2! be imposed.
he

presumed

This Court has held that a life sentence must

until the prosecution has sustained its burden.

iStare v. Pierre, supra)
When
instructions,

the

statutory language

is

juxtaposed on the

an unextraordinary homicide results in the first

Jeath penalty verdict in Salt Lake County in many years.
Jury decision was

The

an abberation, and can only be viewed as

8'

The statute a11d

capricious.

i11slruct1ons failed adequately

tc,

channel the sentencing process.

IX
THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN WERE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AND COULD NOT BE HARMLESS ERROR.
Appellant's counsel requested and the Court read and
tendered a reasonable doubt instruction during the guilt phase
which defined reasonable doubt as:
Now, by reasonable doubt is meant a
doubt that is based on reason and one which
is reasonable in view of all the evidence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof which satisfies the mind
and convinces the understanding of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which
reasonable men and women would entertain,
and it must arise from the evidence or the
lack of evidence in this case.
(Record at
148)
Both phases of trial also demanded the jury to asses:
guilt and
follows:

penalty

in terms of

reasonable doubt defined as

"A reasonable doubt must be a real substantial doubt

and not one that is merely possible or

imaginary."

(Emphasis

added.)
The foregoing definitions have long-standing use it
the experience of the undersigned;
should not excuse the error
the court's
retrospect,

use of

the

however,

in requesting

instruction,

such does not an:

the

instruction an.

which now appears,

to shift the burden to defendant-appellant.
570 F.2d 21

(1st Cir.,

1978),

the

ir

In

instruction a:

issue was held to be error of constitutional magnitude.

In tha:

83
, 's"' the

instruction required ".

.a reasonable person [to]

or suggest a good and sufficient reason."

(Id. 23, En. 1)

The Court concluded that standing alone, the instruction might
not

be

reversible error,

although improper

in itself.

When

coupled with other definitions requiring a strong and abiding
conviction,

not some fanciful or trivial doubt, the instruction

as a whole was patently erroneous and an error of constitutional
magnitude.

(Id. 23-24)
The

right

criminal trial
statutes)

to proof

(and the penalty phase under modern bifurcated
.has long

required."

been assumed.

(In re

368, 90 S.Ct.

beyond a reasonable doubt in a

1068

397 U.S.
(1970),

.constitutionally

358 at 362,

25 L.Ed.2d

(numerous citations omitted))

quoting from Davis v. United States, 160 U.S.

And

469 at 484, the

Court in Winship noted:
.No man should be deprived of his
life under the forms of law unless the jurors
who try him are able, upon their consciences,
to say that the evidence before them . • • is
sufficient to show beyond a reasonble doubt
the existence of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime charged. !9_. at 363
The Court expressly held that the reasonable doubt standard was
required by the Due Process Clause.

(Id. 364)

Although the Court in Dunn v. Perrin, supra, reserved
fur another day whether or not an erroneous reasonable doubt
instruction could ever
Ca

,

38 6 u . S .

18 ,

be

harmless

25),

1 7 L . Ed . 2 d 7 0 5 , 8 7 S . C t. 8 2 4 ( 19 6 6 ) ,

held that errors of constitutional magnitude require scrutiny

to determine whether the

er101

d1J

nut, beyond a reasonble doubt,

contribute to the conv1ct1on before
Appellant submits

being

held harmless.

this standard analogously applies to the

penalty phase of trial as well
appellant was at stake.

inasmuch as the very life of

The

quote in

supra,

quoted above is particularly appropriate.
The instructions at issue herein are closely analogous
to those

in

supra.

The

jury was required to find a

"real, substantial doubt" before acquitting appellant or before
imposing a life sentence.

The jury was required to find an

articulate reason for the doubt.
The cumulative effect of the entire instruction in
each phase was an impermissible shift in the burden of proof.
The

prosecution burden was eased by

the

requirements or

articulation and elevation to a "real, substantial" doubt.
penalty phase was constitutionally tainted,

The

requiring remand

since to require otherwise is to advance the proposition that
there can be harmless constitutional error when imposing the
death sentence.

x
APPELLANT'S JURY PANEL UNDERREPRESENTED
RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES
App e 11 an t ' s
386

U.S.

co u n s e l ,
738

(1967),

as

r e q u i red by

and

639

P.2d 168

(1981),

and mindful of Section 78-46-16, Utah Code

Annotated

(Pocket Supplement, 1983), presents the authority anc
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.,ryument therefor below.
A criminal defendant has the right to a jury selected
from

a

fair

cross-section of

439 U.S.

35,

the community.

58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664

(1979))

Exclusion of a distinct class or race from the jury panel is
constitutional

error.

396 U.S.
For example,

320,

Carter v.

Commission of Greene

24 L.Ed.2d 549, 90 S.Ct.

in Taylor v.

Louisiana,

419 U.S.

518

(1970).

522, 42 L.Ed.2d

690, 95 S.Ct. 692 (1975), the systematic exclusion of women from
the

jury venire deprived the appellant therein of the Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial because of the failure to effect
a fair cross-section of the community.
The triple-pronged test of the "fair cross-section"
rule is set forth in Duren, supra, and requires the following:
(1)
the group allegedly excluded is
distinctive in the community;
(2)
the d i s t i n c t i v e group's
representation in the venire vis-a-vis the
community is not fair and reasonable; and
(3) underrepresentation of the group
is due to systematic exclusion in the
selection process.
The foregoing three factors,

if demonstrated, present

a pr1ma facia violation of the fair cross-section rule and can
Ge

rebutted only by demonstrating a significant state interest

advanced

in the particular selection process.

(Id. 439 U.S. at

176-368)
In the case of

CR-83-1314, et al.,

Third Judicial District, S3lt

County, State of Utah,

defendant therein alleged, and appellant herein adopts the
argument that Hispanics are a distinct community group which,
during the period of January 1, 1983, through March 31, 1983,
(during which time appellant stood trial), were systematically
excluded from the jury venire as indicated by the actual number
of Hispanic

surnames

(43)

on the panel compared to the

statistically anticipated number of Hispanics (99 or 4.98%) on
the panel.

The apparent exclusion of some 56+% of a distinctive

group could be the result of a systematic exclusion under the
jury selection system in place.

The undersigned knows of no

simple method to record and demonstrate the underrpresentation
of Blacks, Hispanics, young adults or other distinctive groups
since ethnic and other distinctive statistics are not maintained
by the court with respect to the jury venire.
Records maintained at the Salt Lake County Clerk's
office reflect that during January of 1983, some 1206 prospective
jurors were contacted resulting in the disqualification of 260
(21.55%)
(23.45%)

and excusal of 23

(1.90%)

for total exclusion of 283

Similarly, February 1983 showed 21.45% excluded due

to 18.73% disqualiCicat1on and 2.72% excusal and March 1983
showed 27.24% excluded via 21.9% disqualification and 5.33%
excusal.

The calendar year 1983 averaged 26.66% exclusion.

No records of ethnic origin, reason for disqualification or
reason for excusal were maintained thereby rendering virtually
impossible any means to compare distinctive social groups.
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Appellant

submits

that the

three-pronged test of

supra, has been met as demonstrated below.
A.

Hispanics are a distinctive group under

criteria of

583 P.2d 69

the

{Utah, 1978), in

that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the Mexicandescent group as distinctive.
475,

98

L.Ed.

866,

74

{Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.

S.Ct.

667

(1954))

Although the

relationship of the Mexican-descent group to the Hispanic group
is unknown to the undersigned,

the former should constitute a

substantial portion of the latter and hence bear some reasonably
substantial correlation to Census Bureau statistics relied on.
Blacks are a distinctive group as well.

{Willis v. Zant, 720

F.2d 1212 {11th Cir., 1983))
B.

Hispanics are underrepresented in the venire.

According to counsel in Bishop, supra,

review indicated more

than half of the statistically expected Hispanics did not appear
on the venire when reviewing the record for Hispanic surnames.
C.

The group is underrepresented through systematic

exclusion.

Although mechanics of systematic exclusion are

unknown to the undersigned and review of juror records at the
rlerk's office reflect only gross statistics, such statistics
show an average of 26.6% are excused, thereby providing a vehicle
uf some sort to effectuate systematic exclusion.
In
death-row

supra, the Court held a Georgia

inmate was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to

demonstrate his allegations that young adults and Blacks were

systematically excluded from Georgia Jut1es.
At minimum, appellant is entitled to a hearing, after
opportunity for discovery, to present evidence in support of
his contentions.

Appellant should be given the opportunity to

obtain any evidence in support thereof by the appointment of
separate counsel and such other experts and resources necessary
to establish the claim.
CONCLUSION

Appellant was deprived of a fair trial because of
impermissible comments upon his failure to testify and his
inability to adduce evidence tending to show deception by the
State's primary witness testifying under a grant of immunity.
Appellant's sentence is grossly disproportionate to treatment
of the accomplice and others convicted of homicide.

The sentencE

was imposed absent meaningful comparison to the alternative life
sentence.

The Information was duplicitous and was based on a

felony murder wherein the felony had merged into the murder.
Instructions shifted the burden of proof without limiting
aggravating factors.
Each error warrants reversal.

The cumulative weigh;

of all errors must compel reversal of all proceedings with
appropriate remand for

new trial, sentencing procedures c

imposition of a life sentence.
Appellant has alleged numerous errors and filed
lengthy brief in support thereof in the belief the record shou:
reflect not only issues raised at trial but also reflect tr
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mistakes of counsel at trial and reflect the benefit of hindsight
in the hope procedural defaults of counsel will not prejudice
the client.

If counsel has burdened the Court, he apologizes;

but if in so doing he has advanced the interests and rights of
his client, he has in some small measure discharged his duties
to his client, the Court and the people of the State of Utah
and society's interest in achieving true and humane justice.
Respectfully submitted this

day of June, 1984.
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